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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and background
The European Union strives to unify its data and privacy protection laws
to simplify business and legal questions across its member states. But since
every country has to implement them by creating specific local laws their
respective adaptions differ.
Large, multi-national companies are usually aware of this situation and
are capable to adapt accordingly. They utilize their own legal department or
consultants and a tightly organized, process orientated IT environment for
this.
Smaller and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), who span usually just one
or two countries and barely have a basic IT department, often lack this kind
of organization. In the worst case they are not aware of the legal implications
of their IT environment and don’t protect their business data accordingly.
Usually this stems from a lack of legal knowledge and a low awareness of
the EU regulations within those IT departments. Typically they do have a
sound knowledge of their applicable business regulations, but consider their
IT infrastructure to be some kind of evolved typewriter. Information and
data is handled in the same way as it was until now on paper, with no
considerations to the new threats which arose from digitalization.
It can be observed that the origin of this problem mostly is a
1. lack of time for duties which do not have a direct effect on the daily
business
2. lack of knowledge in business informatics
The first issue results from the fact that those small IT groups are direct
subordinates of their business leaders. Therefore exists a high incentive for
the business to avoid any work which doesn’t result in a short-term profit or
advantage.
This goes hand in hand with the second issue, which exists because the
business leaders and the IT staff usually don’t have any education in the
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field of business informatics. The business knows that it has to stream-line
its processes and the IT staff knows how to work with hard- and software, but
they lack the understanding of each others domain and therefore can’t utilize
their IT in the most effective way. Since the IT department is subordinated to
the business this often results in technically questionable or even dangerous
solutions.
1.2 Goal of this document
To improve the situation in a SMB this document aims to provide small IT
departments with all the basic knowledge on how to comply with the various
data and privacy protection laws.
A sound knowledge of current legal issues will be provided, together with
the applicable laws on a European and national level.
The IT department should receive all necessary information and tools to
implement a useful information security process and protect its assets accord-
ing to their value and the applicable law. Checklists and other documents
should serve as templates for a quick and easy application of this knowledge
in the daily work.
Since a core area of any business is to communicate, close attention will
be paid to the areas of homepages, e-commerce and emails.
This work should serve as a information resource for business IT depart-
ments. It will therefore look at the consumers rights and data protection
requirements from the viewpoint of the business and how it is required to
protect the data of its customers.
Apart from the legal perspective, one also needs to consider the organiza-
tional and technical structure. Therefore a guideline about how to structure
the IT department and some basic philosophy behind data handling will be
provided. The aim is to provide an understanding about the differences be-
tween technical data handling and organizational information work in regard
to legal issues.
1.3 Structure of this document
After chapter one, the introduction, in chapter two an overview over the
current legal situation in the EU is given. It will show the intentions of the
EU directives and how this affects consumers and other market participants.
Although those directives don’t apply directly, it is the basis for the national
laws and regulations.
The third and forth chapters show in detail how the EU directives are
applied in local legislation in Austria and Sweden and how this affects a local
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SMB. Also national court decisions will be investigated to discuss how the
national courts apply the EU requirements.
In chapter five both countries are compared to each other. It starts with a
general comparison of how they approach the EU legislations and then show
the differences that a business will face if it operates in both of them.
The sixth chapter provides guidelines and tools for a small IT department
to apply the national laws and regulations. Differences between Austria and
Sweden and their effects on the IT operation will be discussed, if they exist.
Chapter six will also show that the terms “data” and “information” are
actually used in a wrong sense in the legal context, as seen from a scientific
viewpoint. But to stay within the same terminology and allow for easier
reading of the legal texts, the correct terms are not utilized in the chapters
before it.
A summary and final conclusion is given in chapter seven and eight.
The appendix provides templates for the IT department to apply this
knowledge in their daily work.
At the end of the document an abstract in English and German is give,
together with the CV of the author.
1.4 Methodology
Chapter two about the EU regulations will be a qualitative research, to de-
fine the area of data protection and how the EU sees it. This is done by
investigating all relevant directives and how they define various terms.
Chapter three and four about Austria and Sweden are a combination of
qualitative and quantitative methods. First the local law and its terms will
be looked at, similar to chapter two. Then a selection of local court deci-
sions will be shown and evaluated in regard to their relevance to a business
environment.
A comparative analysis is done in chapter five to show differences between
the two countries.
Chapter six provides definitions according to Zins’ DIKW model [173] and
then uses a deductive approach to provide data handling processes that are
in accordance with the EU directives.

Chapter 2
EU laws and regulations
2.1 Overview
Before the EU treaty each European country had its own, different, or even
none legislation regarding information handling and commerce utilizing IT
systems. The EU recognized [8, § 0] that a common, unified legislation will
support and push forward business activities and therefore economic wealth
between the countries - if, and this has also been recognized as a main issue,
the market participants trust in the security and privacy of the involved data.
This trust is also a main concern within organizations. It is required that
employees trust their employer and citizens trust their government that the
private data they supply is well protected and laws are in place to enforce
this protection.
Otherwise any party will be very reluctant to give away any data, and
public or economic information exchange will receive a severe negative im-
pact.
The EU has identified several core areas and created according regulations.
From the timeline and the naming of those one can easily see, that the main
goal is to provide a basis for commercial collaboration. This should also be
the main concern for any business - the trust of the other party is required
to receive their data.
It is worth noting that most of the regulations apply to commercial busi-
nesses and government agencies in the same way, which means that the EU
usually does not want to separate between private and state owned parties.
The EU directives also require an organized IT department with clearly de-
fined responsibilities. Otherwise it will not be possible to implement effective
access rights schemes or provide useful logging and monitoring.
Although most of the mentioned services and techniques have their origin
in the Internet, the directives are written to be technology neutral, they
generally apply to any transaction that takes place between two parties who
are not in the same place, but communicate by utilizing some technical means.
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2.1.1 Commerce using electronic communication
• Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services,
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on
electronic commerce”) [8]
2.1.2 Protection of consumers
• Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts
[5]
• Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer finan-
cial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives
97/7/EC and 98/27/EC [19]
2.1.3 Digital signatures
• Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[7]
2.1.4 Electronic money
• Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision
of the business of electronic money institutions [10]
2.1.5 Intellectual property
• Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of
computer programs [2]
• Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [4]
2.1 Overview 17
• Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society [11]
2.1.6 Internet domain names
• Regulation (EC) No 733/2002 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 April 2002 on the implementation of the .eu Top Level
Domain [20]
2.1.7 Data privacy and protection
• Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection
of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy
and electronic communications) [18]
• Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data [3]
• 2001/497/EC: Commission Decision of 15 June 2001 on standard contrac-
tual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries, under
Directive 95/46/EC [12]
• 2002/16/EC: Commission Decision of 27 December 2001 on standard con-
tractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established
in third countries , under Directive 95/46/EC [13]
• 2004/915/EC: Commission Decision of 27 December 2004 amending De-
cision 2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third
countries [23]
2.1.8 Jurisdiction in international electronic
transactions
• 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations [1]
• Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters [9]
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 1496/2002 of 21 August 2002 amending
Annex I (the rules of jurisdiction referred to in Article 3(2) and Article
18 2 EU laws and regulations
4(2)) and Annex II (the list of competent courts and authorities) to Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [21]
• Commission Regulation (EC) No 2245/2004 of 27 December 2004 amend-
ing Annexes I, II, III and IV to Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters [24]
2.1.9 Electronic communications networks
• Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communica-
tions networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [14]
• Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks
and services (Authorisation Directive) [15]
• Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic commu-
nications networks and services (Framework Directive) [16]
• Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [17]
2.1.10 Surveillance and access protection
• Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting
of, conditional access [6]
• Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in con-
nection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC [25]
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2.2 Data protection
2.2.1 Definitions
The legal binding definitions can be found in the EU directive [3, art. 2], and
a short summery is provided here:
2.2.1.1 Personal data
“Personal data” shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who can be identified
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity; [18, art. 2a]
This means that any data that relates to a person or any data by which a
person can be identified, has to be considered. There is no distinction made
if this data is considered “valuable” (to whomever) or if this information is
already available to the public. As one can see, this covers a lot of data in
common business IT systems. It is also important to point out that any kind
of information could be “personal data” - not only data records, but also audio
and video files, paper or other media. The core concept here is the relation
of the data to a certain person.
There is also no distinction being made about how this data was received,
it may be by electronic means, on paper, by voice or otherwise.
2.2.1.2 Sensitivity
A further distinction is being made regarding the sensitivity of the data:
1. sensitive data [3, art. 8 lit. 1]
a. racial or ethnic origin
b. political opinions
c. religious or philosophical beliefs
d. trade-union membership
e. data concerning health or sex life
2. personal data
a. any other data which can be related to a person
Biometric data, like fingerprints or weight, is considered personal data, ex-
cept if it indicates any information about health; this has to be taken into
account when designing biometric access controls. This area also has to be
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reevaluated from time to time, as new discoveries in science might allow to
extract sensitive information from former harmless biometric data, for exam-
ple it might be possible in the future to identify certain medical conditions
from the the fingerprint of a person.
2.2.1.3 Handling
It is important to distinguish between two activities:
• Processing
• Transfer
Processing can be done by the company itself or a subcontractor, who of
course needs access to this data. If he doesn’t have direct access, but instead
receives a copy of the data then this is still covered by the term “processing”.
If the subcontractor is not located in the EU or other accredited countries
(having the same level of legal data protection) then the approval of the local
legal entity is required.
Transfer on the other hand regards the sending of a copy to another entity,
for their own purpose (assuming, of course, that the transfer is approved by
the data owner). Again, no distinction is being made about how the transfer
is done or which medium is used for this. Sending an electronic record, giving
the information by phone or publishing it on paper has the same relevance.
Any handling of data inside a company is not considered a transfer, as long
as it stays within one logical unit. The underlying organizational structure
has no influence here, the important fact is the logical structure. It is there-
fore mandatory that the company has a clean structure with clearly defined
responsibilities and processes.
This on the other hand also means that the transfer of personal data
from one business unit to another is only legitimate if the data owner has
been made aware of it and has approved it. For example a larger finance
corporation can not use its customer data from the insurance business unit
for marketing purposes of its banking unit.
A special case is a company supported club, for example a sports club
organized by the employees, who utilizes the IT infrastructure of the com-
pany. This usually takes the form of an internal homepage and emails to its
members. In this case the separate legal entity of the club uses the company
as a subcontractor, therefore the club is responsible for the protection of the
personal data.
2.2.1.4 Storage
The EU legislation considers only certain kinds of data storage, although this
usually will cover most of the existing databases:
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Whereas the processing of such data is covered by this Directive only if it is auto-
mated or if the data processed are contained or are intended to be contained in a
filing system structured according to specific criteria relating to individuals, so as
to permit easy access to the personal data in question. [3, § 0 art. 15]
Unsorted, chaotic collections of personal data are therefore not covered.
Furthermore the directive states “criteria”, which is also translated as a
plural in other languages. It has therefore been deducted, e.g. in Sweden, that
only databases which can be searched by two or more criteria are covered.
Collections that are only accessible through one kind of search term, e.g. a
telephone book that is sorted only by name, are therefore not protected.
It is also worth noting that there is no mentioning of the storage media;
it does not matter if the data is put on paper, audio or electronic storage
devices, it also does not matter if the data will be processed automatically
or manually.
2.2.2 Data protection philosophy
The main idea in the EU is that data shall only be collected for a certain
purpose and with the consent of the data owner:
Whereas any processing of personal data must be lawful and fair to the individuals
concerned; whereas, in particular, the data must be adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed; whereas such
purposes must be explicit and legitimate and must be determined at the time of
collection of the data; whereas the purposes of processing further to collection shall
not be incompatible with the purposes as they were originally specified [3, § 0 art.
28]
One of the core principles of the EU legislation is that any personal data
is always owned by that person and that this owner can’t give away those
rights. Instead he can only allow others to process or use this data. This
means for example, that if a photograph is taken of an employee and put on
his company ID card, he still remains the owner of the photo, although he
usually gave the company a lot of rights regarding usage.
This is very different from the approach in the USA, where a person can
actually sell his ownership of data. In the area of copyright and intellectual
property this leads to a lot of issues between the USA and the EU.
As a result of this philosophy a company can only collect and distribute
data in a way that was approved by the owner. If he doesn’t agree then
the company is not allowed to collect the data in the first place or give the
data to a third party. The data owner also needs to be made aware of the
involved third parties. It is not sufficient to describe them for example as
“other entities within our corporation”, but instead they need to be listed
with their full legal names.
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The most important issue here is that all of the time the company is
responsible for the security of the data, even if it allows a subcontractor to
process it. If the subcontractor breaks the law then the data owner can hold
the company legally responsible. It is therefore not possible to circumvent
the data protection legislation by utilizing subcontractors outside the EU.
The next point that needs to be considered is that data can only be col-
lected for a certain, well defined purpose. It is not legitimate to create to
create databases for undefined future purposes. The data owner also has the
right to cancel his permission at any time; the data can then not be processed
anymore except to fulfill an existing contract.
Since personal data will probably be used to make business decisions about
a person, the regulations give the data owner the necessary rights to make
sure it is correct. Every person has the right to ask the company about the
data that is stored about them and this information has to be given in an
understandable way, for example need abbreviations to be explained. This
covers all available personal data, including audio, video and emails.
The person also has the right to have wrong entries corrected and to have
the data deleted if it is not needed anymore to fulfill legal obligations. The
desire for a company to keep the data for later analysis is not a valid reason
to keep data infinitely! This right to inquiry and correct personal data can
not be waived.
The data also needs to be protected according to its value and state of the
art of the storage means. This protection also includes the responsibility to
protect against accidental destruction of data. A working and tested backup
strategy is therefore imperative.
2.2.2.1 Register
To manage and control the data processing in each country, a national register
has to be established [3, art. 28].
Any entity that wants to process personal data has to register its applica-
tions and their purpose [3, art. 18-19] before they can be used. To simplify
the process the national authorities can publish predefined templates with
common applications.
Certain very sensitive applications, as defined by each member state, need
an up front audit and approval before they may be used [3, art. 20].
2.2.2.2 Requirements to process data
The EU legislation demands therefore three pillars for a legal application:
1. there has to be a legitimate cause for the processing
2. the data owner approved it
3. the application has been registered (or is based on a legitimate exception)
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Only if all three points apply can the personal data be collected and pro-
cessed.
2.3 Logging and surveillance
Although the EU legislation does not specifically mention log data, it has
to be considered under “personal information”, as soon as a person can be
identified by it. This means that it has the same protection as any other
person related data.
Apart from the EU requirements have some countries enacted specialized
regulations in regard to video surveillance, even distinguishing further be-
tween digital and analog media.
2.4 Copyright
The issue of unlicensed copies of various kinds in combination with modern
information technology has led to difficult legal situations. The EU has tried
to recognize this by differentiating between the acting party and the provider
of a (transport) service.
Since this is a vast legal field only that part which affects data protec-
tion and IT operations shall be investigated. A detailed report with further
information has been compiled by the EU in 2006 [28].
2.4.1 Rights of the creator
The directive [11] covers the rights of the creator over his work, and how he
can protect himself against misuse. The creator can not sell this right, but
rather only gives out licenses of various degrees to allow the usage of his work.
A business is affected by this directive as soon as an employee or subcon-
tractor creates a piece of work for the commercial usage of the company or if
third party property needs to be used, such as product pictures or manuals.
2.4.2 Databases
The EU recognizes that, although databases often consist of public informa-
tion, the creation and maintenance of this collection is an effort in itself [4,
art 0.7]. It therefore protects the structure, but not the content or used tools,
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as an intellectual creation. Still the threat of an user simply extracting all
the data and recreating a slightly different database has also been noticed,
and therefore any transfer with such an intent is forbidden [4, art. 7.5].
2.4.3 Computer programs
Any form of a program, be it binary or source code, has been recognized as a
work of art and therefore has the same protection as a literary work. Unlike
in other legal systems only the expressed program is protected, but not the
ideas or algorithms behind it [2, art 1.2].
Unless otherwise contractually stated, are for any kind of program created
by an employee all exploitation rights automatically assigned to the employer.
This does not cover subcontractors, therefore a distinct contractual clause
is required here. In any case should a specific contract also be made with
regular employees, since even programmers might create work other than
code, e.g. draw an icon or a logo, which would otherwise be protected under
the copyright.
Furthermore it is legal within the EU to reverse engineer a program for in-
teroperability purposes, if the required information is not available in another
way.
2.4.4 Third party transport
According to [8, § 12,13] has the provider, who only transfers or caches on
a technical level information, no responsibility for the transported data. [8,
§ 14] also exempts hosting providers from liability, as long as they remove
incriminating data as soon as they become aware of it.
A similar exception is done in [11, art. 5.1.a] which exempts a transport
provider from liability for copyright violations.
2.5 E-commerce and signatures
Two areas are distinguished here by the EU:
• plain virtual commerce, such as providing services or goods over the In-
ternet
• classical commerce, but utilizing virtual services as a tool
This differentiation has in parts historic reasons, since selling over a distance
was possible by phone already for a long time. Today those two areas are
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covered by the “Directive on electronic commerce” [8] and the “Directive on
the protection of customers in respect of distance contracts” [5]. In practice
any company who wants to conduct business by using the Internet will be
affected by both.
2.5.1 Electronic commerce directive
The EU wants to establish the “country of origin” principle, which states
that a company only has to follow the legal regulations of the country it
operates from to be allowed to conduct business within the whole EU. This is
especially important for business over the Internet, as customers from various
countries should be able to trade with a supplier, without requiring him to
have specific knowledge about the legal situation in each of their countries.
A detailed analysis can be found in [159].
According to [8, § 0 lit. 58] only service providers within the EU are af-
fected. To determine the location of the service provider it is relevant from
where his business operates, not where his physical server infrastructure is
located [8, art. 2c].
It should be noted that already advertising or general information is cov-
ered by this directive. It therefore not only applies to classic web shops but
rather to any web site offered by a commercial party.
2.5.1.1 Information requirements
A service provider has to provide the following information in an easy and
understandable way to his customers [8, art. 5.1]:
• person or company name
• geographic address
• contact information for quick communication, including the email address
• if applicable commercial register number and relevant court
• if applicable the regulating authority
• if applicable informations about professional regulations
• if applicable the sales tax number
For any pricing information it has to be made clear if taxes are included and
if shipping costs are included [8, art. 5.2].
In regard to commercial communication, such as email, is the sender re-
quired to make it clearly visible that the purpose is commercial and also who
the sender is [8, art. 6].
To prohibit unsolicited commercial communications (often called “spam”)
originating from the country with the least legal protections, [8, art. 7] re-
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quires all member states to ensure that the sender of the communication is
clearly visible and respects existing opt-out registers.
Furthermore [5, art. 10] forbids “cold calls” by automated voice systems as
well as fax advertising without prior consent of the other party. Otherwise
advertising, for example by email, is allowed as long as the recipient does
not state his disagreement, which is therefore an “opt-out” system. Member
states may implement more strict rules.
2.5.1.2 Order process
The service provider has to make it clear to the customer [8, art. 10]
• how the process of creating an order works and at which point a contract
comes into existence
• if the customer will have access to the contract text afterwards
• the technical means to prevent entry errors made by the customer
• the available languages
The customer also needs to have access to a copy of the general terms and
conditions in a persistent form.
Unless the communication is done entirely by email or similar tools, the
service provider has to
• provide adequate tools to allow the customer to spot and correct data
entry errors made by himself [8, art. 11.2]
• confirm the acceptance of the order [8, art. 11] immediately to the cus-
tomer. This should prevent from providing misleading information which
might trick a customer into entering a contract that he had no desire to.
Both, the order and the acceptance notification, are considered delivered
if it is possible for the receiving party to retrieve them. In practice this
means that, for example, an email is delivered if it arrives at the recipient’s
mail server, although he might not have retrieved it yet.
2.5.2 Distant contracts directive
Apart from general information requirements, similar to the electronic com-
merce directive, customer rights are defined here.
The commercially most important one is that the customer has for seven
days the right to cancel the contract without providing reasons. The only
costs which he has to bear are those for returning (sending) the received
goods. In case the provider has failed to provide all required information
according to [5, art. 5] upfront, this time period is extended to three months.
In any case has the provider to return the customer payments within 30 days
without deducting any charges.
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Exemptions to this right are defined in [5, art. 6, lit. 3], most notably if
the customer has agreed that the provision of the agreed service shall start
within those seven days or if the product has been customized to him.
2.5.3 Digital signatures
Signatures are the digital equivalent to signing by hand. The system usually
consists of two related keys: a private key, which is only known to its owner,
and a corresponding public key that is readable by everyone. The mathe-
matical background behind those keys allows this person to sign documents
with the private key, which can then be verified by everyone using the public
key, thereby proving the authenticity of the signature and the integrity of the
signed document. Digital signature systems are standardized by the IEEE
[160] and are widely in use in IT systems.
The EU has, based on this, created a directive [7] to enable Europe-wide
digital signatures that can be used to legally sign contracts. This directive
describes the framework around the certificate management and how to im-
plement their legal status to put the same value onto them as on handwritten
signatures. Therefore any further commercial legislation can be applied as be-
fore without any modifications for digital signatures.
2.5.4 Electronic invoices
As part of the value added tax system [26] the EU also mandated how a
valid invoice has to be done. While this allows also for electronic invoices by
using digital signatures, the practical usage has been severely limited through
different implementations in different member states. In some of them the
requirements are also very high, thereby constituting a considerable entry
barrier for SMBs.
The EU has recognized those issues and therefore made an amendment
in 2010 [27, art. 233], which now allows the business parties to agree on the
requirements for electronic invoices themselves, instead of mandating them
through a government authority. It can be assumed that this will lead to
a higher acceptance of electronic invoices, but it has to be noted that this
amendment has not yet been implemented into national law in Austria or
Sweden as of September 2010.

Chapter 3
The legal situation in Austria
3.1 Overview
Austria implemented the EU directives by using nearly the same structure
as in the EU documents. For someone with a sound knowledge of the EU
regulations will it not be a problem to understand and apply the Austrian
version.
3.2 Implementation of the EU directives
3.2.1 Data privacy act
The directive for protecting personal related data has been implemented in
the “Datenschutzgesetz 2000” (DSG [31], data protection act) and the man-
agement of the data processing registrations and other duties related to per-
sonal data are done by the “Datenschutzkommission” (DSK [45], commission
for data protection). The detailed execution of the DSG has been published
in three additional acts:
• Act about adequate data protection in third countries [30]
• Act about the data processing register at the DSK [33]
• Act about template applications according to the DSG [40]
It is worth noting that the DSK consists of only 20 people, with some of them
working part time. It is therefore considerable underfunded which, according
to their own report[47, p. 24ff], hinders them in fully executing their duty.
Although the commission is by law independent [31, § 37 art. 1], this has to
be questioned as some of the executive members are located in the offices of
the federal chancellor and some part time employees are also employed by
the Austrian government in other positions.
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Austria also has the “Datenschutzrat” (DSR [85], data protection counsel),
whose duties are defined in [31, §§ 41-44]. Nearly all members are sent by
political parties and its mission statement is to advice the government in
data protection issues. Since it is therefore by far not independent but also
according to [31, § 35 art. 1] responsible for the supervision of the Austrian
implementation it can be argued that this is in violation of [3, § 28 art. 1].
But so far no legal objections have been raised.
There are also some non-governmental organizations which are related to
the area of data security and privacy, with the most well known of them being
“ARGE Daten” [83]. Since the DSK is not considered independent in the
public opinion, ARGE Daten is often used as the focal point for complaints
in regard to privacy or data protection. They also offer training courses for
applying the regulations in a business environment.
3.2.1.1 Data protection
According to [31, § 1] any processing of personal-related data is prohibited,
except for clearly defined purposes:
• with the acceptance of the person or if he has vitally important interest
in it
• overriding and eligible interest of a third party
• according to the law
• if the data was already in the public
3.2.1.2 Data protection officer
A data protection officer, like in other countries, is not required or even de-
fined within the DSG. If one is installed by a company then he has no legally
binding rights or duties. In some cases a contract (“Betriebsvereinbarung”)
with the local workers’ union can be used instead to avoid asking each indi-
vidual employee.
3.2.1.3 Groups of data
Apart from the types of data as defined in the EU directive
• sensitive data [31, § 4 lit. 2] (“sensible Daten”), which covers data of a very
private nature; for this no third party can claim any eligible interest
• personal related data [31, § 4 lit. 1] (“personenbezogene Daten”), this is
the same as in the EU directive
Austria also introduced additional types
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• specially protectable data [31, § 18 art. 2] (“sonstige besonders schutzwürdige
Daten”)
• indirect personal related data [31, § 4 lit. 1] (“indirekt personenbezogene
Daten”)
The general term of personal data has been split up into two groups. “Personal
data” is any data, which the data processor can directly assign to a certain
person. “Indirect personal related data” on the other hand is any data which
actually relates to a person, but the processor could only make this relation
through illegal means, e.g. through unlawfully using a third party which might
have the information required for a correlation. The aim here is to prevent
the transformation of personal data into unprotected impersonal data by
introducing a layer or third party, without whom the data can not be directly
assigned to a specific person.
The type “specially protectable data” was implicitly introduced in [31,
§ 18 art. 2] because the original definition of sensitive data didn’t include
information about convictions, credit scores and other data which is not as
private as religious affiliation or sexual orientation, but should still be more
protected than other personal related data. This group is not actually defined
by a name in the DSG, but has to be considered separately from the others
for practical reasons.
One main difference from the directive also exists in the coverage of pro-
tection. Whereas the EU only mentions real, physical people, Austria also
protects the data of legal entities, for example companies. One implication of
this is that it does not make any difference for a business if their customers
are people or other companies, the data about them needs the same level of
protection.
3.2.1.4 Registration
If specially protectable or sensitive data is affected and the application is not
covered by a template application, then the approval of the DSK is required
before the application can be used. Otherwise the application can be used as
soon as the registration is sent to the DSK.
3.2.1.5 Internal data usage
The DSG of course also applies to the internal usage of personal data within
a company. Duties resulting from legal or contractual obligations, such as the
payment system, are already allowed by the DSG and don’t require further
approval.
If there is a workers union (“Betriebsrat”) then the company has to make an
agreement (“Betriebsvereinbarung”) with them in case the company wants to
process any further personal information such as systems to monitor and con-
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trol their employees or others which affect human dignity [29, § 96]. Without
a workers union individual agreements with each employee need to be done.
The term “human dignity” has to be considered in a very broad sense. In
one court decision [72] it was ruled that a telephone system, which records
caller, duration and other properties of a call, makes the employee feel ob-
served and thereby affects their human dignity. An agreement with the work-
ers union was therefore required.
3.2.1.6 Information requests
Everybody has the right to ask a data processor for the information they
has about him. The requestor has to provide information about his identity
which allows the processor to identify him in his database. The processor
has to provide the results within eight weeks after he received the complete
request [31, § 26 lit. 4] and he has to provide it on request for free once every
year; otherwise EUR 18,89 can be charged [31, § 26 lit. 6].
The requested information has to be kept for four months, even if the
removal was requested.
Failure to provide the information in time can be punished by up to EUR
500 [31, § 52 lit. 2a].
3.2.1.7 Penalties
Two categories can be applied:
Delict this covers mostly hacking, misuse of data, failure to delete or
correct data and denial of information requests, which can be
fined up to EUR 25.000 [31, § 52 lit. 1]
Omission of registering the application or data transfers, or failure to pub-
lish information about the purpose of the application, which can
be fined up to EUR 10.000 [31, § 52 lit. 2]
Both have a statute-barred prosecution of six months.
3.2.1.8 Changes in 2010
During 2009 changes to the DSG have been discussed and enacted on 30.
December 2009 [32], the most relevant points being:
• a party keeps the role of controller even if the subcontractor makes the
decision if and how he will use the provided data.
• more precise definition of what a processor or subcontractor is
• to be considered “data collection” does not require anymore the intention
to actually use them in an application
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• a “data transfer” is now considered in both ways between a controller and
processor
• any claims to the DSK of a controller about his processor become legally
binding when he registers his data application with the DSK
• it is not necessary to register a manual file under certain conditions
• the registration of a data application has to be done electronically, e.g. by
using the “Bürgerkarte” (citizen card [84], a PKI system)
• the registration for non-sensitive handling will be automated by the DSK
• the DSK has the right to investigate into parties who are suspected to be
required to file a registration but have not done this so far
• if the controller becomes aware of a systematic and severe misuse of his
data, then he is required to inform the affected persons about it
• the legal situation around video surveillance has been better clarified (see
also 3.2.2.3)
3.2.2 Logging and surveillance
3.2.2.1 Generic logging
If the logged data is not related to a person then the DSG does not ap-
ply. In any other case, even if the relation is only indirect, the data has to
be considered person related and therefore the DSG fully applies. It also
has to be observed that only as little data as necessary shall be logged
(“Datensparsamkeit”, data austerity), since data collection without a purpose
is not allowed. Collecting data before it is actually required (stockpiling) is
not allowed for private parties, but only done by the government (see also
the EU data retention policy [25]).
3.2.2.2 Logging of access
Access to personal data has to be logged according to [31, § 14] to control its
validity. Those logs, and others which are acquired on a legal base, are them-
selves personal data since they relate to a person and need to be protected
accordingly. Logs based on [31, § 14] need to be kept for three years and have
to be destroyed afterwards.
In any case may logs only be used for their intended purpose, it is forbidden
to evaluate user behavior from them or use them in any other way (see
also 3.3.2.14). Furthermore may logs only be created in the least necessary
amount.
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3.2.2.3 Video surveillance
In 2010 the DSG has received additions to [31, § 50] to regulate data collection
through video recordings, which are now treated more similar to regular data.
In general is surveillance only allow to protect an object or person, to fulfill
legal requirements or if the recorded people gave their consent. [31, § 50a
lit. 5] especially forbids video surveillance of employees and their behavior.
Furthermore states [31, § 50a lit. 7] that it is not allowed to do an automated
search through the videos using pictures (e.g. “known suspects”) or by criteria
which consist of sensitive data (e.g. skin color).
Any recorded video, if not covered by a legal requirement, has to be deleted
after 72 hours [31, § 50b lit. 2] (weekends and public holidays are excluded).
The video system has to be registered with the DSK, unless it does not
record or only records on analog media [31, § 50c lit. 2].
The controller has to make the fact of the surveillance visible in a way
that potentially affected persons can avoid this physical area and he also has
to make it clearly understandable which legal entity is the controller.
A data inquiry by an affected person has to be answered with a copy of his
video. If this is not possible because rights of a third party might be affected,
then he has to receive a masked video or a written description of it.
3.2.3 Copyright
The term “copyright” is not in use as such, instead the legal base is the
“Urheberrecht” (right of the originator).
All three of the relevant EU directives ([4], [11], [2]) have been integrated
into the “Urheberrechtsgesetz” (UrhG[43]) without any relevant alterations.
3.2.4 Imprint
Any website published in Austria also has to conform to the “Mediengesetz”
(MedienG [36], media act) according to [36, § 1 lit. 5a].
This requires [36, § 24] the publisher to provide his name, city of residence
and purpose of the site in an easy accessible way.
Companies are furthermore affected by the “Unternehmensgesetzbuch”
(UGB [42], business act), requiring them [42, § 14] to publish the following
information:
• company name
• company register number and responsible court
• geographic address
• legal form
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This has to be done on all public communication, including all websites and
also all external email communication.
To simplify the situation, the Austrian Chamber of Commerce provides a
web page per company with all the required information, which can then be
linked to [88]. It still has to be taken care that the information is up to date
and complete.
3.2.5 E-commerce and signatures
The e-commerce directive [8] has been implemented in the Austrian “E-
Commerce Gesetz” (ECG [34], e-commerce law). One relevant alteration has
been made, as the wording of the directive aims at interactions between busi-
nesses, whereas the ECG covers electronic business in general [34, § 1 art. 1],
thereby covering transactions between private and business parties alike.
3.2.5.1 Information requirements
[34, § 5] implements the [8, art. 10] requirement for the service provider to
publish his relevant business and contact informations as well as a download-
able copy of his general terms and conditions (“AGBs”). It should be noted
that common abbreviations, such as “FB” (“Firmenbuch”) or “HG” (“Handels-
gesetz”) may not be used here as they don’t fulfill the requirements.
If the client is a consumer then he furthermore has several rights under the
“Konsumentenschutzgesetz” (KSchG [35], consumer protection act), the most
notable being the right of withdrawal within seven work days, about which he
has to be informed prior to confirming the contract. Failure to provide those
informations extends the right of withdrawal to three months. The consumer
has to pay for the transport in such a case, if this was agreed upon in the
contract.
3.2.5.2 Spam protection
Private and also commercial entities can sign up on the “Robinson Liste” [90],
which is operated by the “Rundfunk & Telekom Regulierungs GmbH” [91], a
government-owned company. According to [34, § 7 art. 2] this prevents other
parties from sending them commercial communication (“spam”). Since this
list therefore needs to be accessible by any commercial party within the EU, it
might be misused to illegally obtain email addresses, as the RTR themselves
notes.
Still any commercial party needs to query this list during marketing cam-
paigns as they might be otherwise subject to legal actions by the recipient.
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Unlike the EU directive, which describes an “opt-out” system, Austria has
implemented an “opt-in” system for emails and other communication forms
[41, § 107]. The only exceptions to this are if
• the sender has acquired the contact information during a prior commercial
transaction and
• it is used to advertise a similar product or service and
• the recipient has an easy and cost free way to stop this (going into “opt-
out”) and
• the recipient is not already on the “Robinson Liste”.
3.2.5.3 Hyperlinks
The ECG covers the linking to informations held by other parties in [34, §
17], which has no equivalent in the directive.
A party who links to external content can not be held responsible for this
content if
• they don’t claim it as their own and
• the external entity is not under the party’s control and
• the link is removed immediately if the party becomes aware of the illegality
of the content.
3.2.5.4 Signatures
Austria implemented the directive [7] in the “Signaturgesetz” (SigG [38], sig-
nature act) and its daily operation in the “Signaturverordnung” (SigV [39],
signature order). Responsible for the Austrian signatures is a department of
the RTR [92].
The SigG itself is technology neutral, but refers to signatures and pri-
vate/public cryptographic information. The SigV on the other hand defines
the approved mechanisms in detail, such as, for example, that RSA, DSA and
elliptic curve may be used in an asymmetric key setup.
Certificates of other suppliers from within the EU are considered legally
equal to the Austrian ones [38, § 24 art. 1].
3.2.5.5 Electronic invoices
The main use of signatures is for, usually high volume, invoice exchange, as
this allows for cost savings in regard to printing, handling and archiving.
Since 2003 such invoices are accepted by the Ministry of Finance [44] if
they
• are signed according to [38, § 2 lit. 3] or
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• are transmitted electronically, as agreed by both parties, and a summary
is also exchanged on paper or signed according to [38, § 2 lit. 3].
The invoices need to be immutable, show the verifiable originator and have to
be kept for seven years, similar to paper invoices. A printout is not sufficient
since the digital signature can not be verified from it. Also both parties need
to agree to the electronic exchange, otherwise paper invoices have to be used.
If a party does not have it’s own ERP and PKI infrastructure then they
can use the “Bürgerkarte” (citizen card [84]), which is part of the Austrian
public PKI, to verify or sign single documents.
Further hands-on information is provided by the Austrian Chamber of
Commerce at [86] and [87].
3.2.6 Electronic communication networks
The four EU directives ([14, 15, 16, 17]) have been implemented in the
“Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003” (TKG 2003 [41], telecommunications act).
It regulates how communication networks may be provided, their accounting
responsibility and data protection duties.
Although this mostly aims at service providers, such as telecoms or In-
ternet providers, any other company might be covered by it as well if they
provide public communication networks such as free wireless Internet access.
This also leads to further responsibilities such as providing informations to
the police [37, § 53]. It has to be noted that there is no legal certainty for
this whole complex until now since a lot of questions have not yet gone up
to the highest court [89] and also since Austria has not yet implemented the
EU directive about data retention [25].
3.3 Local court decisions
3.3.1 OGH legal rules
The following overview includes all existing OGH legal rules up to April 2010
in regard to the DSG, except for [79], [70] and [69] which are not of particular
relevance here.
3.3.1.1 Data deletion and correction [82]
The respondent collects public information about credit ratings in a database
and provides access to this information to a single company, who in turn
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offers this together with other sources to the public. The plaintiff was denied
a mobile phone contract because of this information, whereupon he requested
from the respondent to delete one record about him from the database, which
was refused by the respondent.
The OGH decided that the respondent has to delete, on request, parts of
the collected data even if this would be inconvenient, since the respondent
always has the freedom to delete all data about the plaintiff anyways.
The respondent also tried to claim that he is merely a processor according
to DSG and the other company is the controller. This was denied; since both
of them collect and provide the data they both have to be seen as processors.
Furthermore the respondent argued that he provides the data only to one
customer and even then only against payment, therefore his database can
not be considered public. This view was not seen as correct. Since everybody
could buy access to this data for EUR 25 through the other company, his
database must be seen as public and the DSG fully applies.
3.3.1.2 Public databases [80]
The OGH defined in some detail in which case databases have to be con-
sidered public according to the DSG. Only if the access is restricted to a
well defined, closed community it may be non-public. As soon as in theory
everybody can gain access to the database, for example by paying a fee or
becoming member in a group, the database has to be considered public.
In one case a company operated a credit score database to which only their
clients, typically banks and mobile phone companies, had access via a VPN
line and personal login. Still the OGH considered this to be public, since the
company, based on their own decision, could at any time allow new members
to this group. The company was also considered as a controller and not just
a processor since it collected the data and provided it to its customers.
3.3.1.3 No justification required by client [81]
The controller of a database argued that, although the affected person may
request the deletion of records without any justification, he still has to provide
one on request. This view was denied, as records have to be deleted on request
without any further justification.
3.3.1.4 Usage of public contact information [78]
The plaintiff is the leader of a public commerce alliance and as part of his
work has published on their web page and print publications his email address
and private mobile number, often with the invitation to contact him. The re-
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spondents used this information during a political campaign to invite citizens
to write him and tell their opinion. The plaintiff was then overwhelmed by
the amount of emails and requested that the respondents “stop this”.
It was decided that since he published the contact information, and even
kept doing so during the law suit, this information has to be considered public
and the case was therefore dismissed.
3.3.1.5 Representative [77]
In this case the workers union of an airline company tried to sue their em-
ployer for using personal data in their employee management system without
getting permission from every employee first.
The OGH denied this case for two reasons. First, the workers union as a
representative can’t sue based on the DSG since this can only be done by the
affected individual personally. Second, the workers union has already certain
rights within the company as a representative and by having influence on the
business processes the permission of the individuals is not necessary.
3.3.1.6 Upfront information [76]
If a person has a record in a credit score database, this might cause negative
effects for him in the future. The controller or provider of such records is
therefore required to inform the person that his actions, e.g. having overdue
bills, will result in such an entry. This allows the affected person to challenge
and correct any false informations about the situation.
It can not be claimed that the companies who use the credit score database
have a justified interest in processing this data and therefore don’t need to
inform up front.
3.3.1.7 Specific information [71, 74]
The information of the affected person can not be done by rather unspecified
clauses, such as “entry into a warning list”, but it has to specify the complete
name and controller of the database. It has to be clear who will receive the
information and under which circumstances.
This privilege to transfer information also has to be clearly and obviously
stated, it may not be hidden within the general terms and conditions. The
average reader must be aware which information might be transferred to
which party.
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3.3.1.8 IP addresses [75]
This legal ruling defines that IP addresses, no matter if static or dynamic,
have to be considered customer master data for an ISP and they are therefore
not protected as information in transfer. They can therefore be obtained
and correlated to a name in the same way as the full name or address of a
customer, which usually is done through a law suit.
3.3.1.9 Private information [73]
A person provided private information about himself to a closed audience in
a pub, which was then used by a police officer for other purposes by claiming
that it was now public information.
The OGH denied this view, since the audience was only a very small group
and the affected person did not have the intention to provide it to the general
public.
3.3.1.10 Legal and physical persons [66]
Although the Austrian implementation also covers legal persons, thereby
companies, they can not always apply the DSG to keep their personal infor-
mation secret. Especially business law requires them to publish their financial
statement and other information.
3.3.1.11 Definition of “database” [68, 67]
Here the definition of a database (“strukturierte Sammlung”, structured col-
lection) is made, since the DSG only applies to those.
The OGH defines it as any collection that is organized or can be searched
by at least one criterion, no matter on which media it is stored. Therefore even
paper collections are covered, if they are for example organized by alphabet.
The only exclusion are unsorted collections, such as paper files without order
or a single expert’s opinion.
3.3.2 DSK decisions
3.3.2.1 Video cameras in council housing [48]
The city of Vienna provides flats in some large housing areas. There has been
some considerable vandalism in the public areas, for example at the trash
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bins, and it was considered to install video cameras as a prevention against
this.
After several discussions the DSK ruled that
• it is not allowed to monitor the entrances and the staircases, since this
would be a severe intrusion of the tenants privacy and also has no relation
to the vandalism that shall be prevented
• it is allowed to monitor the area of the garages and trash bins where
vandalism occurred
• the video recordings can only be examined if vandalism has happened, a
permanent viewing is not allowed, and the recordings have to be deleted
after 72 hours if not needed in such a case
• a statistic has to be created about the acts of vandalism that were recorded
and brought to court
• the installation is limited until 31.12.2009
After this deadline the DSK will compare the statistic from the surveillanced
houses against those of houses without surveillance and then consider if the
cameras can stay in place.
This is a good example to show the intention of the law, as the city of
Vienna has to show that is has a rightful need to collect the personal data,
in this case video recordings of the tenants, because otherwise it couldn’t
protect its property. Especially the ruling that only affected areas are allowed
to be monitored make it clear that there can not be a general data collection
without specific purpose.
3.3.2.2 Video surveillance at a company [52]
A ministry applied to the DSK to be allowed to install video surveillance
cameras in its building. Although parts of the decision apply only to the
public sector some details are also relevant to a company environment. The
surveillance was allowed, with some restrictions:
• The video cameras may not record any public space, such as the pavement
in front of the building, unless it can not be avoided, and even then it has
to be kept to a minimum.
• Any recording has to be encrypted and may only be kept for up to two
weeks.
• The records may only be evaluated if one of the cases described in the
application takes place. This means that a routine inspection of the video
files is not allowed.
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3.3.2.3 Manual file [49]
The plaintiff appealed to the DSK to gain access to his personnel file which
his employer, the Austrian government, kept. He assumed that a certain
psychological report in there has caused a negative effect on his career.
The file itself is a unsorted collection of various papers about the employee,
only the files themselves are sorted by the employees names.
The DSK therefore ruled against the plaintiff stating that the Austrian
definition of file is taken from the EU directive which states
whereas files or sets of files as well as their cover pages, which are not structured
according to specific criteria, shall under no circumstances fall within the scope of
this Directive [3, § 0 art. 27]
Although the files are sorted, their content is not. It has no specific structure,
but is rather a collection of loose papers. Therefore it is not covered by the
data protection act and the employer does not have to provide him with
information about the content.
This ruling was confirmed by the Austrian Supreme Court.
It has to be noted that he still has the right to see the content of this specific
file according to the labor legislation, but not as he requested according to
the data protection laws.
3.3.2.4 Usage for other purposes [50]
After staying at a hospital for medical treatment the plaintiff received, as
part of a larger group, a letter from the hospital asking for a donation. Since
he assumed (correctly) that the hospital took his contact information from
his last stay, he appealed to the DSK that his personal data was misused
because it should only be processed during his medical treatment.
The DSK ruled against the plaintiff, because the data was collected in a
legitimate way (medical treatment) and later on used by the same party for
a kind of advertisement of its own medical services. Although this is not the
exact same use as the original cause, it can still be considered compatible.
It was further noted that it would not be legitimate to add the information
if he has donated money to his patient file.
3.3.2.5 Information request [51]
An employee of the Austrian government requested from his employer a list
of all information that has been recorded about him.
Part of this was the request for Internet log files. The employer keeps a
sequential log of any Internet access from within the network and also a log
of logins to the PCs. Therefore this log information has to be considered
personal data, since it can be related to a specific person.
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The employer argued that the access log is only kept to support legal ac-
tions in case of misuse and that it can only be searched sequentially. Therefore
the information request can not be fulfilled since it would cause considerable
costs.
The DSK rejected this argument, because as stated the employer would
search the log in case of legal actions and therefore he is willing to accept
those costs. For the same reason he has also to accept the costs in case of an
information request.
3.3.2.6 Information request and correction [53]
The plaintiff requested that the controller of a database, in this case a mar-
keting company, lists all his records and deletes them. The company just
“locked” his records and asked the plaintiff for more clarification about why
and upon which incident he wants to have the records deleted.
The DSK decided against the company, since the plaintiff only has to
request the deletion by specifying how the controller got hold of his data.
The controller can not put more work onto the plaintiff, even if it might
cause more effort for themselves. Furthermore the plaintiff does not have to
prove that any further data transfer has been done, rather the respondent
has to provide a list if there have been any such.
3.3.2.7 Language of information request [54]
The DSK stated that any request to them has to be done in German since
this is the official language for Austria. In this case a request was done in
Italian and English, and it was therefore denied.
3.3.2.8 Timeliness of information request response [55]
The controller has according to the DSG eight weeks of time to respond to
an information request. In this case the response did not include all data,
therefore the DSK ruled that after eight weeks the controller has not fulfilled
his obligations.
3.3.2.9 Data processing outsourced [56]
The respondent answered to an information request by the plaintiff that he
can not provide any data since this is in whole done by another company, in
this case a tax consultant. He himself does not process any person related
data. The DSK denied this argument since the respondent gave the other
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company the order to process the data and therefore he is still the controller
of it. The respondent as the controller has therefore to answer the request,
even if he has to acquire it from his subcontractor first.
3.3.2.10 Unstructured data and time of request [57]
In this case a company hired a private investigator to find an information
leak, who afterwards provided a paper report about the suspected person.
This person found out about the observation three years later and filed an
information request against the company and the private investigator to find
out what kind of information about him has been collected, which was not
fulfilled in both cases.
His complaint was denied by the DSK because at the time of his request
any data about him did not exist anymore on the private investigators IT
system. Furthermore the report only existed in unstructured paper form and
therefore was not covered by the DSG.
3.3.2.11 IT Subcontractor outside the EU
Two companies applied to be allowed to process person related data at a
subcontractor in the USA [58, 59]. Both requests were approved by the DSK
since they could show a contract which included the EU standard contractual
clauses [13] and therefore assured a sufficient protection for the data.
Similar decisions have been made in regard to outsourcing to Turkey [60]
and India [61].
3.3.2.12 Form and wording of a data inquiry [62]
The plaintiff asked a bank about a specific query of the credit register which
seemed to have taken place without him having any relationship with the
bank. Since the answer of the bank did not satisfy him, he filed a complaint
to the DSK regarding an incomplete request for information according to the
DSG.
The DSK denied his request, since from the text of his request it was not
obvious to the bank that he wanted to receive information according to the
DSG.
3.3.2.13 Credit rating inquiry through subcontractor [63]
In this case a business used a rating company to decide if a new customer
was credit worthy. The rating company holds records of the credit history of
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a person and calculates a yes/no answer according to a logic predefined by
its customers. The plaintiff filed an information request against the first com-
pany, which they answered by stating that they only keep his static records,
such as name and address, and a yes/no credit score. Everything else is at
the rating company and they can therefore not give any further answer. Even
the algorithm behind the yes/no answer can not be stated since this is done
at the rating company.
The DSK denied his complaint, since the given response was correct and
complete. But they also stated that he has the possibility to file another
request against the rating company to receive the information he probably
was interested in.
Furthermore it was stated that if he would also request informations about
how the yes/no credit score was (automatically) generated, the first company
will have to explain this in detail. This arises from the fact that this company
defines the algorithm herself before providing it to the rating company, which
makes them the data controller in this case and the rating company the
processor. They therefore have full responsibility according to the DSG since
the data is (logically) transferred to them.
3.3.2.14 Evaluation of IT systems activity logfiles [64]
The plaintiff was an employee of the Austrian tax office and was about to
apply for a higher position. As part of his evaluation for this position the anti-
corruption officer made a logfile analysis of the plaintiffs data access of the
past eight years to evaluate his behavior patterns. Since some private queries
were found the plaintiff had to face negative consequences. As a result of this
he filed, among other points, a complaint about misuse of data , in this case
logfiles.
The DSK approved this point of his complaint. Any data controller has to
keep access logs for three years, but not longer. Also this information may
only be used to monitor misuse of the system, but it can not be used to
gather information about the behavior of a person
3.3.2.15 Webhoster is processor [65]
In this case the respondent used a web hosting company to provide access
to person related data against payment, but failed to state this fact and
therefore also the identity of this web hoster to the plaintiff.
The DSK stated that according to the DSG even the saving of data makes
an entity into a processor, therefore the respondent has in this case the role
of the data controller and the web hoster has to be considered a processor
and subcontractor.

Chapter 4
The legal situation in Sweden
4.1 Overview
Sweden has long been known to be one of the leading social states worldwide.
The government provides many services for the citizens which therefore re-
quires it to collect and process a lot of personal data. The core concept of
the data protection legislation is therefore to protect individuals, which also
shows in the term “personuppgift” that translates to “information about a
person”.
Another Swedish institution is the “ombudsman”, a contact person who
is supposed to settle disputes, usually between a customer and a service
provider. In regards to data protection the “Datainspektionen” [144] has been
given this role, among other duties. It is therefore also politically recognized
as a valuable institution and receives sufficient funding for its work. Currently
they employ more than 40 people and also provide a telephone hotline for
concerned citizens.
The Swedish government works according to the publicity principle (“of-
fentlighetsprincipen”, [93, ch. 2]). This makes any document within the gov-
ernment, with some exceptions, accessible to the citizens and is codified in
the “Offentlighets- och sekretesslag (2009:400)” ([110], publicity and secrecy
act). Of course this sometimes leads to the disclosure of personal data since
it may be part of official databases or documents, but this usage is covered
by the Swedish implementation and therefore legal.
Also journalism is of high public value which results in a very good pro-
tection of newspapers and other means of publishing. As a side effect of this
a lot of the privacy protections might actually not apply if certain conditions
are met (see 4.2.2.4).
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4.2 Implementation of the EU directives
4.2.1 Overview
The Swedish implementation is split up into three parts, covering the data
protection, the processing of it and the supervising body.
4.2.2 Personuppgiftslag (PuL [100], Personal Data Act
1998:204)
This is the Swedish adaption of the EU Directive 95/46/EC [3] and therefore
has a similar structure. It is in general often less specific than the EU directive
and leaves the implementation details mostly to Datainspektionen.
One important fact is stated in [100, § 2], which says that other, conflicting,
laws have precedence (lex superior) before PuL. The most important example
is the law for official statistics [104], which allows the publishing of every
citizens income report. Whereas this would be secret information in most
countries, every Swede can download the tax report of his neighbor. Other
examples are government statistics about the income per occupational group
or geographical area.
In [100, § 3] the law is limited to information about living natural persons
which further shows the intention to protect the citizens. After ones death
the personal data is therefore not covered anymore by the PuL! Furthermore
no distinction is made if the information can be directly or indirectly linked
to a person, both cases are considered personal data.
[100, § 7] excludes personal data from protection if it is used by the press.
Sweden has in general a very good protection of the freedom of the press
and freedom of speech, and here again this overrules the PuL. It has to be
noticed that this is limited if the information is published on the Internet,
as this would allow access from outside the EU; an example will be shown in
4.3.1.
Sweden has introduced [100, § 11] that is not found in the EU directive,
which explicitly states that the use of private data for direct marketing pur-
poses is not allowed if the affected person forbids the processor in written to
do so.
Under certain circumstances, most importantly by approval of an offi-
cial ethics committee, does [100, § 19] allow the processing of even sensitive
personal data without the consent of the persons for statistical or scientific
purposes.
[100, § 20] prohibits the processing of information about legal offenses,
unless stated otherwise. So far the most well known exception has been to
allow Antipiratbyrån [141], a private organization working against software
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piracy, and the IFPI [151], a private organization that works against audio
copyright violations, to collect personal information about people who are
suspected to be exchanging unlicensed material by means of file sharing [145].
Every Swedish person has a “personnummer” (personal number), which is a
unique identifier. This is widely used to identify e.g. customers, and although
it is personal data it is not really considered secret. [100, § 22] therefore allows
for processing of this ID without the consent of the affected person if it is
needed to securely identify the person or for other important reasons.
Any inquiries to a processor need to be answered with one month, or, if
there are special reasons, within four months as specified in [100, § 26]. It is
required to request this in written and signed by the affected person.
[100, § 28] defines that if a decision in regard to a person is automatically
made based on personal data, then the processor can be required to describe
based on which data and according to which logic this decision was made.
This is not an exact implementation of the EU directive and gives the affected
person more rights than intended on the EU level.
In [100, § 31] the necessary security measures for the processor are de-
fined. This is worded rather general and leaves out the detailed list of the
EU directive, especially the need to protect data against accidental loss is
not mentioned here. On the other hand gives [100, § 32] Datainspektionen
the power to define the necessary measurements for the processor and fine
him [100, § 45] if he doesn’t comply. This can be seen as a very practical
implementation of the EU directive as it allows the group with the most
hands on experience, Datainspektionen, to create fitting rules for each real
life situation.
Sweden uses the possibility to define a personal data representative (PDR,
“personuppgiftsombud”) in [100, §§ 37-40], who is an employee of the processor
but needs to be independent enough to supervise the data processing. He
takes partly the role of Datainspektionen and therefore it is not necessary
anymore to notify them of new data applications. Instead the PDR has to
keep track of the internal data usage and make sure that any processing is
according to the law; when in doubt he has to contact Datainspektionen. This
exemption does not apply if the personal data is about sensitive data, such
as genetics, taxes or law enforcement. He should also be the contact person
for third parties in case data needs to be corrected or removed [100, § 40].
In case of a misuse it will still be the processor who has to compensate the
person, not the PDR [100, § 48].
4.2.2.1 Datainspektionens föreskriftet 2001:1
How PuL is applied in practice is defined by the rules Datainspektionen
publishes. In [149] the exceptions from the compulsory registration of data
applications are defined, such as:
• If the data is processed with the consent of the person.
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• If the controller himself keeps a register and the data
– is not sensitive and about membership, employees or customers, or
– is about sick leaves of employees for payroll purposes, or
– is required by the employer to fulfill legal obligations.
4.2.2.2 Förordning (2007:975) med instruktion for
Datainspektionen (DIFS [108], ordinance for the data
inspector)
This lays ground for Datainspektionen, the Swedish implementation of the
supervising authority requested by the EU directive [3, art. 28], although the
details of its responsibilities are codified somewhere else [101].
In [108, § 1] it is explicitly stated that this institution is not barely for the
management of the data processing register, but that it also should monitor
and advice on upcoming technical developments as well as provide support for
PDRs. It is furthermore responsible for cooperating with the EU Schengen,
TIS and Europol groups [108, § 4].
4.2.2.3 Personuppgiftsförordning (PUF [101], personal data
ordinance 1998:1191)
Here Datainspektionen is defined as the responsible institution for the super-
vision of the processing of personal data [101, §§ 1-2] as well as the details of
it’s duties and rights.
[101, §§ 3-5] state again the exemptions under which data processing does
not have to be registered, especially noting the Freedom of the Press Act.
Although sensitive personal data can be used for statistical or scientific
research [100, § 19], [101, § 10] requires the processor to apply at least three
weeks in advance to Datainspektionen even if an ethical committee has ap-
proved the processing.
Organizations representing a certain branch or sector can utilize [101, §
15] to request an opinion from Datainspektionen during the development of
a branch agreement on data processing.
[101, § 17] introduces the right for each Swedish citizen to ask Datainspek-
tionen for support in regard to the EU directive (stopping the processing of
personal data [3, art. 14]), if the processor is located outside Sweden but
covered by the directive.
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4.2.2.4 Utgivningsbevis
Sweden places a high value on the freedom of speech, giving it even priority
over PuL. This effect is caused by the “utgivningsbevis” (publishers certifi-
cate), which states that the owner, which can be a person or legal entity, acts
as a publishing source. Its legal base is [93] and [95], and it can be obtained
from “Radio- och TV-Verket” (radio and television authority [153]) for SEK
2.000. The owner of the certificate will then be put under special legal pro-
tection as a journalist, basically disabling any PuL liability for him in regard
to published content.
The requirements for this certificate, in case of a website, are [95, ch. 1 §
9]:
• the publisher is identifiable and a resident of Sweden, and
• the origin of the distribution is in Sweden, for example the server location,
and
• it is accessible by the public, and
• the content comes from a database which only can be modified by the
owner of the certificate, whereas a website is considered such a database,
and
• the name of the distribution (such as the website) is unique in a way that
it can not easily be confused with another entity.
Although the publisher needs to be named on the website, any person creating
content and publishing it there has the right to anonymity [95, ch. 2 § 1].
The publisher has no legal obligation to disclose their identity. This goes as
far as even having a state entity, such as the police, asking for the identity is
illegal [95, ch. 2 § 2].
4.2.3 Logging and surveillance
In general the Swedish laws try to define the requirements for video surveil-
lance in a rather generic sense, and it is then the duty of the authorizing
entity to decide in each specific case about the details of the surveillance
system.
4.2.3.1 Lag (1995:1506) om hemlig kameraövervakning [96]
This law regulates the usage of hidden video surveillance for the prevention of
crimes which are punishable with at least two years of prison. The surveillance
may only be done as long as necessary, but topmost one month [96, § 4].
Any surveillance needs to be applied for at the local “länsstyrelse” (county
administrative board) which might approve it only with detailed restrictions.
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4.2.3.2 Lag (1998:150) om allmän kameraövervakning [99]
If the surveillance camera is to be public visible then it will be covered by
this law.
In general need the affected persons to be made aware of a camera by a
sign before they enter the camera’s field of vision [99, § 3]. Still the regulations
in regard to PuL need to be observed as well.
If the camera will be able to watch a public space then it has to be approved
by the local “länsstyrelse” beforehand [99, § 5].
Inside a shop (but not restaurant or similar) cameras may be installed to
prevent theft if they can not be panned or zoomed, they only observe the
entrance and cash register area and a written agreement has been made with
the employees or their representative [99, § 12].
Unless otherwise approved may the recorded material only be kept for
topmost one month.
4.2.4 Copyright
The three EU directives have been implemented by amending the existing
copyright law (“upphovsrätt” [94]). But unlike in Austria or other countries,
the employer also receives the moral rights on the work created by his em-
ployees, which allows him further reaching modifications of the work [170, p.
11].
Another important difference from other countries is that there is no right
to ones own picture (in German “Recht am eigenen Bild”). The “upphovsrätt”
only covers the rights of the author or creator, but does not specify the rights
of the person whose picture is taken. This reaches so far as that the hidden
filming of a person can not be prosecuted [121]. Only when such personal
data is published can PuL, or an act of libel, be applied.
4.2.5 E-commerce and signatures
Sweden has implemented the e-commerce directive in the “Lag (2002:562)
om elektronisk handel och andra informationssamhällets tjänster” (act about
electronic trade and other services of the information society [105]), although
with the alteration that a Swedish court or other state entity may disallow a
foreign party to conduct e-commerce in case it is necessary to protect
• the public order and safety
• the public health
• consumers
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In such a case the EU has to be informed and consulted about the matter.
4.2.5.1 Information requirements
The same requirements as in the directive are given:
• name
• address
• email address
And, if applicable
• organizational number
• tax number
• regulatory agency
4.2.5.2 Spam
The articles about commercial communication [8, art. 6-7] have not been
implemented in the Swedish law as part of the e-commerce legislation. In-
stead the marketing law (“marknadsföringslag” [109]) has been amended to
include email and other forms of electronic communication as further means
of advertizing to an individual. Article 5 of the directive [8, art. 5] about
information requirements is covered in [109, § 12] of the marketing law, but
with modifications:
• The properties of the product have to be described in a way that is ade-
quate for the media in use and the product [109, § 12 lit. 1].
• The sender has to reveal his “identity” [109, § 12 lit. 3], but it is not further
specified what details are meant by this.
• Apart from the pricing and delivery details also the process of how com-
plaints will be handled has to be included, if they differ from common
trade conventions [109, § 12 lit. 4].
Unsolicited communications (“spam”) are not allowed to be sent to physical
persons without prior consent [109, § 19], which means that Sweden uses an
opt-in system. Consent can be assumed if the recipient has
• provided his electronic address during the sale of a product, and
• not denied the usage of his electronic address for this, and
• the content is about similar products of the same provider, and
• an easy and cost free possibility to stop the usage is provided to the re-
cipient as part of each message.
Furthermore every message, even such to legal entities, has to include a valid
response address to which requests for removal can be sent [109, § 20].
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If a vendor from within Sweden [109, § 22 lit. 2] offers some kind of guar-
antee for the product, then he has to include informations about it and the
customers requirements to claim it.
The consumers agency (“Konsumentverket” [152]) can be applied to if a
consumer wants to take action against unsolicited communications or other
forms of illegal business behavior.
4.2.5.3 Hyperlinks
There exists no specific legislation in Sweden in regard to hyperlinks. In the
past years only two relevant court decisions have been made where linking
had been an issue. In general the linking party is not responsible for the
content that it links to, unless it uses the target content within its own
(business) context [119]. The latter is the case, for example, if a merchant
puts a link next to his product which links to the product description on the
manufacturer’s website.
4.2.5.4 Signatures
Sweden has implemented the directive in the “Lag (2000:832) om kvalificer-
ade elektroniska signaturer” (act about qualified electronic signatures )[102]
and the “Förordning (2000:833) om kvalificerade elektroniska signaturer” (or-
dinance about qualified electronic signatures [103]). The Swedish law is a
nearly literal implementation of the EU text, with no significant changes.
Electronic signatures have been widely used in Sweden before other coun-
tries. In 2001 the major Swedish banks formed a consortium [143] to provide
signatures to their customers and shortly afterwards the government started
to provide them as well [150] through the national personal ID cards. Today
it is very common to do online banking and administrative applications over
the Internet by using those methods.
4.2.5.5 Electronic bulletin boards
A lot of communication on the Internet is done through public readable
forums or similar mechanisms. Sweden has therefore implemented a specific
law [98] for such environments which applies unless
• the messages are only exchanged for technical purposes, or
• the forum is used exclusively within the government, a company or a group
of companies, or
• the forum is protected by the freedom of speech, or
• the recipient is a specific person or group of persons.
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The provider of a forum is required to
• inform any participant upfront about how messages will be visible to other
participants [98, § 3], and
• monitor the forum within a reasonable effort [98, § 4], and
• remove any illegal content as soon as he becomes aware of it [98, § 5].
4.2.6 Electronic communications networks
Similar to the situation in Austria may a party that provides wireless network
access to the public be considered a provider under the “Lag (2003:389) om
elektronisk kommunikation” (act about electronic communication [106]). The
Swedish implementation of the intellectual property directive (IPRED [22]),
which amended the copyright law [94], then imposes the obligation onto him
to provide any party who sues for copyright infringement with the personal
details of his client.
In practice this is often not relevant, since the law only requires to provide
existing data. Some Internet service providers therefore stopped to store log
files or other traffic related information about their customers to avoid those
obligations [142]. It also has to be noted that Sweden has not yet implemented
the data retention directive [25], which means that this practice is not against
the law.
4.3 Local court decisions
4.3.1 Publishing of personal information on a web page
4.3.1.1 Journalistic purpose [114]
Although this incident happened in 1997 and the court decision was made in
2001, it still has influence on the current application of PuL.
In this case the owner of a Swedish web page (“Foundation against Nord-
banken”) published personal data about several top managers of Nordbanken,
a Swedish bank, out of anger about the current banking crisis in Sweden. The
published information included lots of personal data, such as suspicions by
the police that this person is involved in a crime, but also personal com-
ments from the owner about the managers. Furthermore it allowed the users
to add more information and link it to other public data. This seemed of
course to be in breach with the “datalagen” (data act), the predecessor of
PuL; also it seemed to be a structured database that has not been registered
with Datainspektionen.
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His defense was that he offered the data in a way that is not automatically
processable and which is meant for journalistic purposes. He brought up
further proof that his site indeed did research and was meant to inform the
public, and also that the data was collected from public sources. Therefore
it needs to be protected as freedom of speech under the PuL clause, which
came into action 1998.
The supreme court decided in the end that the web page indeed was in-
tended to inform the public, although in a very subjective way, and therefore
is protected under freedom of speech. The indictment was therefore dismissed.
4.3.1.2 Private homepage [117]
An employee of a local church made, after taking part in a web page design
class, a homepage with general personal information (names etc.) about her
co-workers, but also included one piece of medical information (“has a broken
leg”).
The court decided in this case that the compilation of a list of people
on a web page indeed constitutes a structured database according to PuL,
which here even included sensitive data. Although the personal data was of
rather public origin, she would still have needed to apply to Datainspektionen
beforehand.
Although the court found her guilty of breaking PuL, it was in this case (for
various reasons) considered a minor contravention and the case was dismissed.
4.3.2 Publishing on a web page equals to export to a
third country [120]
The Lundberg’s Foundation School published on their web page personal
data about one employee by stating that he had difficulties with teamwork
and was on sick leave. Apart from the obvious PuL violation the court ruled
furthermore:
• Any information published on a web page has to be considered as trans-
ferred into a third country, since the web page is visible worldwide. This
was also confirmed in other court decisions [117].
• The chairman of the school, who actually manages the homepage, was also
appointed by the school to do this task. Therefore it is his responsibility to
comply with the law, which means that he will have to bear the sentence,
in this case SEK 40.000.
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4.3.3 Publishing under a false name [116]
A man created several ads on the Internet under the identity of his former
partner, claiming that she was looking for sexual contacts. He included per-
sonal data about her, but according to him not sufficient enough to identify
her, and also a photo that was supposed to depict her (although it did not).
The court ruled that the provided data was detailed enough to identify
her. Also the picture must have been perceived by the viewer as depicting
the victim, no matter if it was really her or not. Since the ad was available to
more than 900.000 viewers according to the webmaster of the site, the court
saw this as a severe breach of the victim’s privacy and therefore convicted
the accused to three months in prison and a fine of SEK 100.000.
4.3.4 Access to public information
In all of the three following cases the court assumed that the requesting
company will treat the data in question internally according to PuL, the part
that shall be discussed here is whether the company should get access to the
data in the first place.
4.3.4.1 University records [112]
A private company requested from KTH, a public university, the names,
grades and addresses of all students who finished during the last four years
(ca. 1.400 records). It intended to use this for recruiting purposes and re-
quested the information under the Swedish publicity principle. KTH denied
this request by claiming that the information is protected under PuL and
that the company has not been registered to operate such a database.
The company argued in court that it requests the data only sorted by
last name and in paper form, which means that is only searchable by one
term and therefore not covered by PuL. Afterwards they intend to manually
calculate the average grading and only keep the records of those students
above a certain average score, again on paper and ordered by this score.
Those students will then be contacted by phone. At no point will the data
be processed electronically.
The court followed this argumentation and the data had to be disclosed.
4.3.4.2 Recipients of student loans [115]
Sweden has a central register of student loans, issued by the state, from
which a company wanted to have the name, address and email address of
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the students. It intended to send them once per term an offer for a student
discount card. The request was denied based on privacy considerations.
Since the offer was only to be sent once every six months and the recip-
ients could opt-out at all, the court decided that the information had to be
disclosed. The commercial interest of the company outweighted in this case
the privacy interests of the students, since the students could benefit from
the offer. Furthermore it was stated that although being on the loan list im-
plies that the student does not have lots of money, it does not allow any
further deductions about his financial situation and therefore this data is not
considered sensitive.
4.3.4.3 Farmers records [113]
A producer of farming supplies asked the ministry of agriculture for a copy of
the milk farmers register, which includes their name, address and milk quota.
The ministry denied the request based on privacy concerns.
The Supreme Court ruled that the register has to be disclosed, based on
the considerations that the commercial interest of the producer outweights
the privacy interests of the milk farmers, who in this case have to be con-
sidered professionals and not private persons. Also the farmers will have the
opportunity to opt-out of any marketing material they might receive [109, §
20].
4.3.5 Publishing of the bankruptcy index [125]
After a finance company went bankrupt a professional liquidator, another
company, was assigned to the task. As part of their work they published
the bankruptcy estate list on the Internet, which included the names of all
debtors and creditors and their respective amounts. They argued that this
list is public anyways since everybody can get it from a government agency
as well and also that every creditor has the legal right to see the information
about other creditors, and therefore it is not protected under PuL.
The court ruled against this, stating that the creditor and debtor amounts
have to be considered sensitive data. The fact that the information is available
to the public by the government does not imply the right for a third party
to publish it. Instead they would have to obtain the written consent of any
affected person, as mandated under PuL.
4.3 Local court decisions 59
4.3.6 Website protection under the “utgivningsbevis”
[124]
On a website, which had an “utgivningsbevis”, several blogs were hosted. One
of them posted an email and IP address and asked its readers to find out who
is behind them, which they did by posting it in the comments section.
The Office of the Chancellor of Justice decided in this case that the blog
post itself was protected under the freedom of speech act, but the comments
were not, since they were not under the control of the editor.
4.3.7 A juristic person is not protected by PuL [118]
A company did not receive its tax statements from the government due to
a wrong address record at the government agency and therefore didn’t pay
their taxes, which lead to an execution title. The company claimed that,
according to PuL, the government was obliged to correct the data based on
other correspondence that the two exchanged.
As part of this case, which is more complex, the court stated that a juristic
person is not covered by PuL and the company therefore had to explicitly
inform about the new address.
4.3.8 Fingerprint database not allowed for minor
identification usage [122]
In this case a school used a fingerprint system to identify which pupils may
get a meal from an automated system, based on if they have pre-paid it. The
registration and usage of the fingerprints was done without written consent,
since the school argued that only 30 data points of the finger are scanned,
which is not equal to a full print, and that the computer system is independent
from other school databases. It is therefore not sensitive data, just private one,
and since the interest of the school to serve meals only to paying customers
outweights any privacy considerations, the processing should be allowed.
The court ruled against this, citing that any biometric data, even if it
is just 30 data points of the finger print, already constitutes sensitive data.
Furthermore the school can use less intrusive methods to authenticate their
customers, such as food stamps or magnetic cards. For both reasons the
written consent of the pupils or their parents is required.
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4.3.9 Missing product information [123]
A car evaluation company offered through its website a service to determine
the value of the customer’s car and send the result back to him via SMS. Due
to the misleading design of the website the customers were often not aware
that they will be charged SEK 399 for this service. There was also just a
small note in the fine print about their rights to cancel the contract under
the distant marketing law. Furthermore the company claimed that, since the
evaluation of the car started at once, they already have waived this right.
Last, the terms and conditions of the contract were only available on the
web page in fine print, since the company claimed that this page has to be
considered permanent and therefore fulfills the information duties under the
law.
The court dismissed all claims by the company and stated that the in-
formation in fine print was not sufficient to inform the customers. Since the
pricing was not very visible while the customer enters his contact informa-
tion, it was not sufficient either. The court stated that the information has to
be displayed in a way which is consistent with the Internet as a communica-
tions medium. The company also has to include the informations according
to [107, § 7] in the sent SMS, since this is the only confirmation which the
customer will receive.
4.3.10 Responsibility for linked web pages
4.3.10.1 Links to MP3 files [111]
In this case from 2000 a private person put links to MP3 files on his homepage.
The files contained unlicensed music, but were hosted on a server outside
Sweden which had no relation with the defendant. He claimed that he put
the links only there to attract more visitors for his homepage.
The Supreme Court ruled that, apart from the question if the files were
legal or not, the linking party is not responsible for their content since the
other server was not under his control.
4.3.10.2 Links to pages which infringe copyright [119]
The accused company is part of larger enterprise with branches in various
countries. The name of one of their products contains a term to which the
plaintiff holds the copyright in Sweden. Although the company was not ac-
tively using this term, it was still part of their product descriptions which are
hosted by the enterprise in Denmark. The defendant argued that, although
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their web page was linking to those descriptions, they had no control over
the Danish sister company, and therefore can’t be held responsible.
Here the court ruled that although the defendant only links to the pages
they still use them for their business purposes and to describe their own
products. The defendant is therefore responsible for the linked content and
in this case is guilty of copyright infringement.
4.4 Guidelines and decisions made by Datainspektionen
4.4.1 Guidelines
A lot of disputes are directly settled by Datainspektionen and therefore never
taken to court. From their experience with this work they have published
general guidelines [147] for common issues, from which some examples shall
be discussed here.
4.4.1.1 Entrance and exit log
Instead of relying on the personal reports of their employees a company wants
to install an electronic gate to monitor their working hours.
Since this kind of control can be done with less intrusive means the com-
pany may only use the electronic gate if specific evidence indicates that misuse
is happening. In any case is it required to inform the employees about what
kind of data is collected and for which purpose.
4.4.1.2 Usage of photograph in employee database
A multinational company wants to include a picture of their employees in
their company-wide human resources database, which can only be access by
a small group of people.
Since the privacy interests of the employees are higher than the unsub-
stantiated reasons of the company, the explicit consent of the employees is
required. It is also required to allow the transfer or making available of these
pictures outside the EU or equal areas.
4.4.1.3 Mobile phone cost controlling
A company allowed private calls on their business mobile phones, as long as
the costs don’t become a financial burden. To control this they started to
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evaluate the bills and call lists on a per phone base. This is allowed since the
company has provided the phones for a specific task and may monitor if the
usage is in compliance.
4.4.1.4 Video surveillance of the server room
Assuming that the data will not be linked to a structured database, the
privacy of the server operators has to be considered against the interest of
the company to protect its assets. A general answer can therefore not be
given.
4.4.1.5 GPS tracking off-site employees
If the information is used to keep track of vehicles and calculate their mileage,
then it may be done with prior consent of the drivers.
In other cases it has to be in accordance with the purpose of the company,
the interest of the company has to be higher than the employees’ and they
have to give their consent. In any case it may not be used to control working
hours since less intrusive methods are available.
4.4.1.6 IP phones
Since the information is usually only transported in this case, PuL is mostly
not applicable here. The only exception is that malicious code or other parties
might intercept the conversation; according to PuL it is therefore necessary
to provide sufficient technical protection for the transport.
In case one of the parties wants to record the conversation or if logging
information is to be processed or stored, PuL has to be fully applied.
4.4.1.7 Monitoring of emails and Internet usage
According to PuL may any personal data only be used for a specific pur-
pose, minimal required time and with the least required amount of data. The
employer therefore needs to publish rules about what kind of data is being
collected and for which purpose. Furthermore the terms “misuse” or “miscon-
duct” need to be defined so that every employee clearly understands what he
may or may not do with the IT systems and under which circumstances his
traffic might be monitored.
Nevertheless, if the company allows private usage, of for example emails,
they may not inspect this private information. It is therefore required that
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guidelines are made available about how to separate this private information
from the company one.
4.4.2 Decisions
Apart from event driven investigations, Datainspektionen mostly does rou-
tinely inspections of public entities and publishes their findings or recommen-
dations. Since PuL applies to those institutions and private companies in the
same way, the results can also be used there.
4.4.2.1 Usage of social media
Some agencies use Facebook ([138], [139], [140]) or similar pages to publish
information about themselves and to answer questions. It furthermore allows
their users, in case of Facebook their “followers”, to post their own messages
on this site. Since the owner of the page, the government agency, can configure
what services are available to the public, they are not only the data processor
for their own data according to PuL but also responsible for the informations
published by other users.
Datainspektionen argues, that it is the free decision of the page owner to
allow comments, therefore they also have to take the responsibility for them
in case personal related data is published. However this does not required
the agency to permanently monitor the comments, rather it has to publish
guidelines about acceptable content, and remove inappropriate content as
soon as they become aware of it. In the case of for example Twitter, the page
owner can not control the content (“tweets”) that other parties send him,
therefore they can not be held accountable for it.
4.4.2.2 Unmoderated forum
A Swedish website offered its users to review local companies, either the
ones automatically added through queries of public databases or by adding a
new entry through a user. The site claimed that it is not responsible for the
published data since it only provides an unmoderated forum and requires the
users through its terms and conditions to obey PuL and other laws; therefore
the users are in fact the data processors.
Datainspektionen rejected this argument [136]. Since the site owners de-
signed the functionality and also have the possibility to edit or delete com-
ments, they are in fact responsible for the published personal data.
The site also claimed that, since the data is about companies, it is not
protected as personal data. This was in part denied by Datainspektionen,
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since they also had data about small businesses that trade under the owners
name, which therefore is personal related data [97, p. 341].
4.4.2.3 Access to personal data
A private company offered in their web order form for customers the func-
tionality to enter their personal number (“personnummer”) and then have
their address information automatically filled in. This was done by the web
page through a web service offered to companies by the central registration
office, a government agency.
Since this could be done before the order was completed, it could be mis-
used to retrieve the address information of any (unprotected) Swedish citizen
if their personal number was known.
Although those informations are public in Sweden, Datainspektionen or-
dered [137] the company to remove this function since it is not a core re-
quirement of their business. The privacy rights of their customers are more
important in this case than the desire of the company to simplify the order
process.
4.4.2.4 Video surveillance
A local bus operator had problems with sabotage and the distribution of hate
speech pamphlets within its bus depot, which is only accessible by employees.
The company therefore installed hidden cameras to investigate.
After this became public, Datainspektionen filed a complaint [133] since
this is in breach with the video surveillance law and PuL, especially since
one of the cameras also was aimed at the entrance of a workers union space.
It is clearly stated that only law enforcement agencies might use hidden
surveillance whereas a public company has to inform the affected people
upfront about it.
In another case [134] a shop owner installed four hidden cameras in the
back office, in addition to several visible ones inside the shop and one outside.
Datainspektionen decided that, for the same reasons as above, the hidden
cameras are illegal. Also the camera in front of the shop was an intrusion into
the privacy of bypassers and had to be removed. Furthermore had the shop
owner the ability to watch all those cameras from home over the Internet.
This was considered unnecessary for the stated purpose, namely protection
against robbery or theft, and therefore also had to be removed.
4.4 Guidelines and decisions made by Datainspektionen 65
4.4.2.5 Utgivningsbevis
A public school published regularly information about their internal pro-
ceedings and decisions, which in one case included the names of two pupils
who were extolled from the school. The school argued that, since they own
a publishing certificate (“utgivningsbevis”), PuL can not be applied in this
case.
Datainspektionen, in line with the Federal Court, has decided that this
publication is not protected and PuL is applicable. The only reason for this
decision is that the public school is part of the government and therefore can
not claim the protection of freedom of speech.
4.4.2.6 Required authentification method
The Swedish National Service Organization (“Pliktverket”, the military re-
cruiting agency) provided a web interface where all examined people could
log in and access their medical records and other personal data. The authen-
tication was done through the personal number (“personnummer”) and a pin
code, which was sent by regular mail.
Since this is highly sensitive medical data, Datainspektionen decided that
a simple eight digit pin code does not provide sufficient protection [132].
Also the information, required by PuL, about the data usage is found
under the “about us” link on the web page, but not directly on the pages
with the personal data or the login page, which Datainspektionen therefore
considered insufficient.
4.4.2.7 Keeping of old business data
A travel company stores its customer data within a customer relationship
management (CRM) system, which includes contact data, travel details and
information about complaints. If the customer does not book another travel
within three years then the data is removed from the CRM system, but will
still be kept in an archive for 10 years due to accounting laws.
Datainspektionen remarked [130] that the data should only be kept for
two years, as common in the travel business. For longer periods the consent
of the customers is required. Also it has to be investigated what parts of
the customer data need to be archived for accounting, some details such as
complaint letters might not be necessary and therefore should be removed.
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4.4.2.8 Customer data
One of the largest grocery chains in Sweden introduced a discount card pro-
gram to provide its customers with special offers for products they often buy.
This was done through a database of all the items that were bought by each
customer. Although the customers who used the card could opt out of the
advertising, their shopping lists would still be recorded.
After a four year monitoring period this was found to be according to the
law by Datainspektionen [131]. Every person who signs up for the discount
card is informed in a proper manner about the way the data will be collected
and for which purpose it will be used, and they have to give their consent by
signing the application.
4.4.2.9 Encrypted transmission
The social service of a city offered help for various health and social related
questions via its website. The users could send in an email and the team
would respond by publishing the information anonymized on their web page,
or directly by email if requested.
Since this involves a lot of sensitive information, Datainspektionen ruled
[128] that the response email has to be encrypted so that only the intended
recipient may read it, especially since it is sent through the public Internet.
In another case [129] used a public school a web platform where the parents
could enter information about the absence of their children, such as sickness
or a doctor’s visit, and the teacher could then see this information. The access
was protected by a username and password, which was sent to the parents
by email.
Again Datainspektionen ruled that since this involves sensitive data, the
access had to be protected with stronger mechanisms such as the Swedish
“e-legitimation”. Furthermore the email to the parents needs to be encrypted
as well, so that only the intended recipient may read it.
4.4.2.10 Processing of criminal records
A USA based consulting company that operates worldwide is by USA law
required to register with the SEC (US Securities and Exchange Commission).
This includes in depth information about their business processes and also
informations about their employees, such as if they have been convicted to
more than one year of prison for breaking a law.
The company applied to Datainspektionen for an exception from PuL,
so that they can collect and process this information from their Swedish
employees. They would like to ask them three simple yes/no questions, so no
full criminal record would be used.
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Datainspektionen denied the request [127] since the general questioning
of all employees is a too deep intrusion into their private life and is not
outweighted by the business interest of the company.
In a second case the local traffic operator for Stockholm (SL, “Storstock-
holms lokaltrafik”) wanted to combat their graffiti problem by creating a
database with information about each incident, such as a picture, the “tag”
(nickname of the graffiti creator or group), time, place and the police register
number. They argued that this would allow them to correlate individual in-
cidents, for example through the “tag”, and therefore aid the police in finding
the offender.
Here Datainspektionen noted that the “tag” might also be personal infor-
mation, since it can be related to an individual and that in this special case
the whole content of the database is basically visible to the public, since SL
is a state owned company and therefore has to observe the “offentlighetsprin-
cip”. Still, the interest of the company to reduce their damage losses has to
be seen higher than that of the offenders, and therefore the exemption was
approved [126].

Chapter 5
A comparison of Austria and Sweden
Both countries implemented the directive in mostly the same way in regard to
its structure and intention. In the following shall the differences between each
other or to the directive be discussed. Terms or mechanisms which are identi-
cally between the two countries and the directive are not further investigated
here.
5.1 Legal environment
Although at first glance both countries seem to be similar in regard to popu-
lation size and economy, distinct differences can be seen in the legal area and
in the way how the Internet is used in daily life.
5.1.1 The legal entities
The Austrian administration is organized in a very hierarchical way, with a
minister on top of each department who is authorized to issue instructions
down to each level.
In Sweden the government departments are rather small in size. The ac-
tual daily work is done in independent agencies (“myndigheter”), which only
execute the laws without the possibility for the minister to directly influence
them.
Also the general public in Austria perceives a ministry more like a super-
vising body, sometimes even an annoyance. The Swedish public, on the other
hand, sees their “myndigheter” more like service providers which are there to
help them, sometimes even owe them a service.
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As a result of those general philosophies the implementation of the inde-
pendent governing agency, as required by the EU data privacy directive [3],
differs greatly.
Austria implemented the DSK like any other agency, thereby utilizing state
personal, which makes it in practice very dependent on the government. This
had the effect that the public saw a need for an independent party, and thus
ARGE Daten was created as a counterpart. Furthermore the DSK is provided
with only very limited resources, and can therefore only exercise basic duties.
A lot of investigations, training and law suits about privacy violations are
therefore done by ARGE Daten, a private society with its own agenda.
The Swedish Datainspektionen is in practice independent and also has
sufficient funds for their duties. A lot of their work involves interactions with
other state agencies to solve data issues. But they also investigate private
companies, respond to complaints from citizens and provide training. It can
be said that Datainspektionen is well integrated into the Swedish society and
the state administration.
5.1.2 Data protection philosophy
In Austria any personal related data is considered to be part or property
of that person and can therefore only be utilized with his agreement. Very
strict boundaries are set in how this data might be used and by whom. It
is in general rather uncommon to share personal data with the public or for
the government to provide internal data to citizens (“Amtsverschwiegenheit”,
official secrecy).
Sweden, on the other hand, has a long history of providing certain personal
data to the public. The public principle (“offentlighetsprincipen”) allows any
citizen full access to government records, even those about other citizens,
such as their tax records. Still, data misuse is absolutely not accepted by the
public. The general idea is that a specific data set is provided to a specific
party for a very specific purpose, because that party is providing a service.
If that party happens to be a government agency, then anybody should have
access to it since the government, in the end, is a servant of the public. The
question of privacy is therefore not a black and white decision, but rather
shades of gray, which can be observed in a lot of court decisions where the
interest of a third party is weighed up against the privacy of the data owner.
5.1.3 Daily usage of personal related data
Although Austria is already using electronic data exchange heavily within
the state administration, it is rather uncommon between the state and pri-
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vate or commercial parties. The biggest hindrance is probably the lack of a
widely available public key or certificate infrastructure. The introduction of
the “Bürgerkarte” [84], a chip card with a signature, has so far had a very bad
reception and the card is not in wide use, especially since it requires a card
reader device. Electronic signatures between companies only exist as isolated
applications, and between companies and private parties basically only for
electronic banking.
In Sweden the first electronic signatures were introduced by the bank-
ing sector. It included the possibility to download the certificate into the
browser, which was perceived as secure since the user also had to authenticate
to his banking application via a hardware token. This service was therefore
already in widespread use when the government introduced their online ser-
vices, which lead to a good acceptance by the public. Today a certificate can
be obtained either through ones bank or from the Ministry of Finance. It is
very common to interact with state agencies through secured web services or
for private parties to do business over the Internet.
5.2 Adaption of the EU legislation
5.2.1 Implementation of the directives
Both countries have implemented all relevant EU directives in national law
with the only exception that Sweden has not yet adapted the data retention
directive. There are still debates ongoing about how this will have an impact
on the freedom of speech and how it may be compatible with existing laws.
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5.2.2 Definitions
5.2.2.1 Official translation of the directive, as provided by the EU
English German Swedish
personal data personenbezogene
Daten
personuppgifter
processing Verarbeitung behandling
filing system Datei register
controller für die Verarbeitung
Verantwortlicher
registeransvarig
processor Auftragsverarbeiter registerförare
third party Dritte tredje man
recipient Empfänger mottagare
the data subject’s
consent
Einwilligung der
betroffenen Person
den registrerades
samtycke
Table 5.1 Official translation of the directive
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5.2.2.2 Wording of the implementations
EU / English Austria Sweden
personal data personenbezogene
Daten
personuppgifter
indirect person related
data
indirekt
personenbezogene
Daten
-
especially protection
worthy data
besonders
schutzwürdige Daten
-
affected person Betroffener den registrerade
data application Datenanwendung -
data collection - samling
filing system Datei -
usage verwenden -
processing verarbeiten behandling
blocking (of a transfer) - blockering
cede überlassen -
transfer übermitteln överföring
controller Auftraggeber personuppgiftsansvarig
assistant (employee) of
the controller
- personuppgiftsbiträde
data protection officer
(of the controller)
- personuppgiftsombud
processor Dienstleister personuppgiftsbiträde
interconnected
information processing
system
Informations-
verbundsystem
-
branch office Niederlassung -
representative - förträdare
third party Dritte tredje man
recipient Empfänger mottagare
the data subject’s
consent
Zustimmung samtycke
Table 5.2 Wording of the implementations
5.2.2.3 Person or data subject
The directive clearly states that the data of natural persons shall be protected
(“an identified or identifiable natural person” [3, art. 2 lit. a]), which Sweden
implemented as “en fysisk person som är i livet” [100, § 3] (“a living physical
person”).
Austria, on the other hand, extended the coverage by stating “natürliche
oder juristische Person oder Personengemeinschaft” [31, § 4 lit. 3] (“natural or
legal person or association of persons”), which thereby also covers companies
or other legal forms.
74 5 A comparison of Austria and Sweden
The practical effect is that in Austria for example any customer database
about companies has the same level of protection as one about single persons.
The consent of a company is therefore needed if one would like to process
their contact data or similar.
5.2.2.4 Personal data
The terms “specially protectable data” and “indirect personal data” have been
implemented in the same way, but Austria also introduced two more terms.
The first, such as criminal convictions or credit scores, are covered in
Sweden as “personal related data”, such as anything else that is not specifically
“sensitive data”.
Indirect data is not known in Sweden, since it is always looked at if the
processor can relate the data to a person, even with the aid of a third party
that might be available for him. If there is no way to relate it, then it is not
considered personal data.
5.2.2.5 Personal data filing system
The directive describes such a system as a set of personal data “which are
accessible according to specific criteria” [3, art. 2 lit. c]. This has been trans-
lated into German as “die nach bestimmten Kriterien zugänglich sind” and
into Swedish as “som är tillgänglig enligt särskilda kriterier”.
Although all three versions use the plural of criterion, which would indicate
two or more, Austria has implemented this as “die nach mindestens einem
Suchkriterium zugänglich sind” [31, § 4 lit. 6] (“which are accessible by at
least one search criterium”).
As a result of this any sorted data collection, thereby accessible by at least
one criterion, is protected in Austria, whereas it would not be in Sweden,
where it needs to be accessible by at least two criteria.
This has practical implications especially for sorted paper filings, since
those are usually sorted by exactly one criterion.
5.2.2.6 The data subject’s consent
The Austrian law requires that the data subject is aware of the circumstances
when he gives his consent (“in Kenntnis der Sachlage” [31, § 4 lit. 14]), whereas
the Swedish law requires that he had been informed up front (“efter att ha
fått information” [100, § 3]).
While this is a subtle, but relevant difference, in such as that the Swedish
law requires an actual information transfer to the data subject, no court
decision or other incident could be found to elaborate this further.
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5.2.3 Legitimation
While the basic requirements [3, art. 6] are implemented nearly literally in
both countries, the “Criteria for making data processing legitimate” [3, art.
7] differs.
Sweden basically just translated the text into Swedish [100, § 10], while
Austria crafted a more complex system in the DSG.
The term “schutzwürdige Geheimhaltungsinteressen” (privacy interest which
is protection worthy) is introduced in [31, § 7]. It is then defined under which
circumstances those are not violated, in [31, § 8] for non sensitive data and
in [31, § 9] for sensitive data. Also several cases where the interests of a third
party prevail are explicitly defined for both kind of data, such as:
• to fulfill vitally important interest of a third party
• to protect claims of the processor in court
• in case of a catastrophe to identify missing people or find their relatives
The Swedish personal number is a special case [100, § 22], where the pro-
cessing is allowed without explicit consent if an unambiguous identification
is required. In practice this is handled rather restrictive by Datainspektionen
when it comes to IT systems [146], since using individual usernames fulfills
the same purpose without disclosing personal information.
5.2.4 Information duties
Both countries have extended the directive in this regard, Austria even in a
very detailed way.
Both allow one data inquiry to a controller per year free of charges. While
the request in Austria has to be done in written and by proving ones identity,
which would allow the usage of digital signatures, Sweden requires a written
and (hand-)signed document, which in practices means a letter. The reply
has to be given in Sweden within one month and in Austria within eight
weeks, or can be denied in both countries if the required effort would be
disproportional high.
Sweden has no regulations in PuL about exceptions [3, art. 13] due to
national security etc., since those are handled by the “offentlighetsprincip”
[110].
Austria also added that the controller may not delete data about a person
for four months, beginning from the notification about an inquiry [31, § 26
art. 7].
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5.2.5 Correction and removal duties
The directive grants every person the right to demand rectification, erase or
blocking of his data [3, art. 12 lit. b].
This was implemented in Austria as the right to demand the data to be
deleted or to be corrected, both within eight weeks. The term “blocking” is
not used in the DSG.
In Sweden the decision about the action to be taken is done by the con-
troller [100, § 28]. The idea behind this is that the controller has to make
sure that his usage of the data is according to the law, how he does it is up
to him.
All of those rights, information, correction and removal, can not be utilized
in Austria if the controller only uses indirect person related data [31, § 29].
5.2.6 Confidentiality and security
Sweden has rather simplified [3, art. 17 lit. 1] in that the controller is only
required to protect the data by adequate means, but not specifying which
threats he has to protect against [100, § 31 art. 1]. On the other hand specifies
PuL that, if a subcontractor is used, the controller not only has to check if
he is able to provide the necessary security measures but also that he really
utilizes them [100, § 31 art. 2].
Austria added a lot of detailed instructions to their implementation, which
do not exist in the Swedish PuL:
• Every employee has to be instructed about his duties according to the
DSK.
• All processing orders for employees need to be kept in a way so that they
can inform themselves at any time.
• All employees need to be bound by a contract that allows them to use
personal data only according to processing orders and that they have to
keep it secret even after leaving the company. Subcontractors may only
use employees that are also bound by such a contract.
• The access controls to the company rooms have to be defined.
• The logical and physical access controls to software and data has to be
defined.
• The access to computers with personal data has to be protected.
• Any access to personal data has to be logged, but this logs may not be
used for other purposes, such as performance reports about employees.
• All organizational measures to accomplish this need to be documented.
Both this and the log files have to be kept for three years.
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An Austrian subcontractor may only utilize further subcontractors if he in-
forms the controller about this up front and he agrees [31, §11 art. 2 lit. 3].
The Swedish implementation does not have such a restriction.
5.2.7 Registration and notification
Very different approaches have been used in this case by the two countries.
Austria did not implement the data protection officer [3, art. 18 lit. 2]
and therefore requires the registration of every database or application that
uses personal data. The registration has to be done electronically with a
digital signature, which in practice means using the “Bürgerkarte”. The only
exceptions are standard applications, as defined in [40]. But since most of
them aim at the public sector and the remaining ones often don’t cover all the
data items utilized by companies, those exceptions quite often can’t be taken
into account. A documentation about the security measurements according
to [31, § 14] also has to be included. If sensitive data is included then a prior
assessment by the DSK is required.
Sweden tries to shift the responsibility more to the controller. In general
needs every data application to be registered, but there are several exceptions
as described before 4.2.2.1, which in practice means that only uncommon
applications, and such about sensitive data, will have to be registered with
Datainspektionen. If a registration is required, then it has to be done in
written and signed by the controller since an electronic registration is not
possible.
In comparison it can be said that Austria tries to have a central register of
all applications, whereas Sweden strives to make sure that somebody, prefer-
able one close the the application, is always responsible for the data usage
and can act as a contact person.
5.2.8 Transfers to third countries
Both countries allow the transfer and processing within other EU members,
as well as in the USA if the recipient has signed the “Safe Harbor” agree-
ment, and into countries with an adequate level of protection. The latter
cases are in Austria defined by the chancellor [31, § 12 art. 2], in Sweden by
Datainspektionen [100, § 35 art. 3] or in general through EU regulations:
• EU
– Argentina
– Guernsey
– The Isle of Man
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– Jersey
– Switzerland
– Canada (under certain circumstances)
• Austria [30]
– Switzerland
– Hungary
• Sweden [148]
– Norway
– Iceland
– Liechtenstein
It can be seen that both added those neighboring countries which at that
time haven’t been EU members (Hungary joined in 2004, but the Austrian
act is from 2002). Sweden chose the option to simply include all European
Economic Area members to achieve this.
5.2.8.1 Other countries
Unless covered by the exemptions in [31, § 12], Austria requires a pre-approval
from the DSK and a legally binding agreement with the foreign party before
personal data may be transferred. One such exemption is found in [31, § 12
art. 3 lit. 2], which allows the transfer if the data is only indirect personal
related for the foreign party. This opens the possibility to pseudo-anonymize
the data before the transfer and then recombine it when the results come
back. Before mentioned agreements are specifically the EU standard contract
clauses [13] or Binding Corporate Rules (BCR), or other contracts if approved
by the DSK.
Sweden also allows the transfer if such contracts are used [101, § 13 art.
2], but does not require any approval in such a case.
5.2.9 Penalties
The EU directive only defines that a victim is eligible to remedies [3, art. 22]
and that the controller can be held responsible in such a case [3, art. 23], but
does not give further details.
The Austrian DSG defines the punishments in [31, §§ 51-52]:
• Any data misuse motivated to gain profit: up to one year in prison.
• Other misuse of data, as well as denying a court decision to the right to
data inquiries, correction or removal: up to EUR 25.000.
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• Failure to register an application, failure to get approval from the DSK
failure to publish required information: up to EUR 10.000.
• Failure to fulfill a data inquiry, correction or removal request in time: EUR
500.
The Swedish PuL defines in [100, § 49] a prison sentence of up to six months,
or in severe cases up to two years, for:
• Supplying false information to a person or Datainspektionen as a response
to an inquiry.
• Processing data without a legal base.
• Transferring data to a third country without a legal base.
It should be observed that in Austria the controller, as a legal entity is ac-
countable, whereas in Sweden the physical person, who was responsible for
the action, will be held accountable.
5.3 A comparison of practical applications
5.3.1 Video surveillance
As a general idea considers Austria this topic to be related to data privacy,
with links to other laws, and therefore included it in the DSG, managed by the
DSK. Sweden took the approach that this is about surveillance and protection
from crimes, with some links to data privacy, and therefore made a separate
law that is managed by the local county administration (“länsstyrelse”). This
also leads to the effect that Austria differentiates between analog, digital,
live and recorded monitoring, wheres in Sweden it is all considered to be the
same, namely surveillance. Only if the data is processed in Sweden in a way
that constitutes a database, PuL will be applicable.
Hidden cameras may in Austria only be used by the police for crime pre-
vention, while Sweden also allows them for private controllers upon request
[96, § 3].
A significant difference is that Sweden includes audio recordings as part
of the video recording, if both are done together, while the Austrian law
specifically only allows video images.
Any visible camera needs to be indicated, such as by signs. In Austria it
also has to indicate the identity of the controller, if it is not obvious, while in
Sweden this is not required if the outside of a building or site is monitored.
Also public areas may not be recorded unless it can not be avoided, in which
case it has to be kept to a minimum.
Whereas Sweden made an exception that allows monitoring within a shop,
which is a common application, in Austria all situations are treated equally.
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Austria only allows recordings to be kept for 72 hours, whereas Sweden
states up to one month, or longer if applied for.
It can therefore be said that Austria sees video cameras usually as an
intrusion into privacy which has to be kept to a minimum, while Sweden
rather accepts their usage by providing guidelines.
5.3.2 Internal log file analysis
Both countries have the same position, as mandated by the directive, that log
files are collected with a specific purpose, such as securing an IT environment
or for technical capacity statistics. Any further analysis, such as employee
behavior, is not covered by this purpose and therefore forbidden.
5.3.3 Providing a static web page
A static page is characterized by not allowing any user generated content,
although it may publish personal related data.
5.3.3.1 Imprint
Although it is in both countries required to state the identity of the publisher,
Austria has far more strict and detailed regulations in this regard. While
Sweden follows the idea that the visitor should be able to easily retrieve this
information, it leaves the actual layout up to the publisher. Austria however
requires the publisher to provide the full information on every page, either
directly or behind one link.
5.3.3.2 Logging
The IP addresses of page visitors are considered private data, since they can
be related to a person, even if only through a third party. Austria uses the
term “indirect personal data” for this, while Sweden considers it personal data
at least since the introduction of the IPRED law.
It can still be done in both countries for the purpose of statistics and
protection of the page, if the visitor is informed about it. The same is valid
for the usage of “cookies”.
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5.3.3.3 Publishing personal data
While in Austria personal data can only be published in accordance with
the DSG, Sweden adds extensive exclusions through the publishing certifi-
cate (“utgivningsbevis”). This can be utilized by private persons as well as
companies to claim the “freedom of speech” and therefore circumvent the
restrictions implied by PuL.
5.3.4 Providing an interactive web page
In addition to the issues around a static page, the publisher has here to
deal with personal information about his users as well as with the content
published by them.
5.3.4.1 User list
If a user explicitly has to sign up for a service then his consent can be assumed,
and Sweden therefore does not required the registration of the database.
Austria has no such exceptions, and therefore it has to be registered, unless
it is covered by one of the application templates. In both cases the information
can again only be used for the stated purpose.
5.3.4.2 User generated content
This situation arises when a forum functionality is provided, where users can
post public visible messages or comment on those of others. Here the owner
of the web page has the role of the publisher and the users are the content
creators. Problems usually arise if a user publishes offending material but is
hidden behind his pseudonym.
In both countries the media publishing laws cover this topic, in Austria
[36] and in Sweden [93, 95].
The Austrian law mandates that the publisher has to remove any incrim-
inating content as soon as he becomes aware of it [36, § 6 art. 2 lit. 3a], or
otherwise he might be forced to do so [36, § 36a]. The identity of the content
creator can be kept secret [36, § 31 art. 1].
Although Sweden provides strong protection through the “utgivningsbe-
vis”, this can only be applied to content that is under the publishers control.
Forum entries are therefore not protected. Instead the “law about electronic
bulletin boards” [98] has to be applied, which includes the same obligations
as in Austria, such as removing offending entries as soon as the publisher
becomes aware of them.
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It is still possible in two ways to utilize the Swedish “utgivningsbevis” for
most of the web site:
1. All new forum entries are checked by the publisher before they become vis-
ible for others. In this case he has control over the content and is therefore
protected by [93].
2. The main web page is separated from the forum page, technically and
logically, for example by hosting it on a different DNS name and giving
it a different visual layout. In this case the main page can be protected
through the “utgivningsbevis”, while [98] only applies to the forum. Using
HTML links between those two is not prohibited.
In any case is the publisher responsible for the content, and if legally chal-
lenged he will have to defend it.
5.3.5 Publishing of personal information on a web page
In Austria the DSG fully applies, as publishing data on the Internet is the
same as making it available to everybody worldwide. No personal related
information about employees or third parties can be published without their
prior consent.
For Sweden two situations have to be distinguished, depending on the ex-
istence of an “utgivningsbevis”. In general the same situation as in Austria
exists, in such as that prior consent is required. But with an “utgivningsbe-
vis” PuL can be ignored since the freedom of speech overrules it, and the
publishing of personal data can not be challenged in court. Several credit
scoring companies in Sweden utilize this to offer complete profiles of every
citizen over the Internet, partly even for free and accessible by everyone.
Chapter 6
Summary of the situation in Austria
and Sweden
The European data protection directive and its related legislation aims to
provide companies as well as private persons with a single set of rules that
apply throughout the European Union. But since these need to be translated
into national law by each country, certain differences among the member
states evolved.
Austria and Sweden have based their laws related to data protection on
the same EU directives, but their implementations and legal effects differ.
The result is influenced by their existing laws that needed to be adopted, as
well as by the general legal philosophy in each country. As a basic principle do
both provide the same legal environment for a company, with some different
details as described before. The real differences come into effect during the
practical application and by looking at how data protection is “lived” in each
country.
6.1 Austria
It is safe to say that Austria has a rather strict, detailed legal system that
tries to lay out in detail what a citizen may or may not do. Aided by the facts
that the DSK is underfunded and that in general not many law cases in regard
to data protection are brought to court, it leads to a rather unexplored legal
area. The lack of data protection officers further puts more load on the DSK.
It also leads to some kind of neglect within the data controllers, since nobody
advices them about how to comply with the law or does the actual work there.
This is as well noticed by the DSK when they receive applications for data
transfers into third countries based on unknown, because unregistered, data
applications [47, p. 42].
Austria took they way of implementing the data protection tools as a whole
new area of law, which sometimes leads to conflicts with existing legislation.
A good example is the area of video surveillance, where Austria differenti-
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ates between analog and digital systems, and the question if the material
is recorded or not. The decision to implement the supervising agency as an
entity that is closely related to the government, thereby acting against the
directive, can only be interpreted as an act of unwillingness to “burden” the
local economy with the requirements of the directive. The given examples of
legal cases also show that the relevant law is seldom applied in practice, and
even in such cases it usually involves a government agency as the data proces-
sor. Only limited investigation is done by the DSK because of its described
limitation in resources.
By looking at the Austrian law in detail it has been shown that the in-
tended purpose of the directive has sometimes been complicated by the in-
troduction of such additional concepts as indirect personal related data or by
not implementing a data protection officer. Especially the latter issue leads
to considerable costs for businesses.
On the positive side it has to be mentioned that third parties, such as the
Chamber of Commerce and ARGE Daten, provide sufficient support for their
members to be able to comply with the legislation. For example by providing
a company information page on wko.at it is considerably easy for a business
to supply all required information according to the e-commerce regulations.
6.2 Sweden
The Swedish law on the other hand tries more to provide a general guideline,
which is then enacted in detail through the responsible agency, Datainspek-
tionen. A further level was added by allowing for independent data protection
officers within companies, who then can get back to Datainspektionen with
questions. This system gives Swedish companies a very interesting incentive
to fully comply to the law, by allowing them to handle the registration and
monitoring internally through their data protection officers. In cases where
the law is broken, complaints to Datainspektionen or law cases are done
quite often. It can therefore be said that data protection is a common part
in Swedish business life.
Sweden took a slightly different route in implementing the EU legislation
by trying to amend existing laws, where possible. This has lead to a good
integration into existing legal areas, again for example by looking at the way
video surveillance is regulated. The implementation of the governing agency
as one of many others also seamlessly integrates with the governmental en-
vironment that companies are used to work with. Finally, by encouraging
companies to employ an independent data protection officer within their or-
ganizations, the majority of the administrative effort is done by the businesses
themselves while Datainspektionen can focus on supervising the correct han-
dling of personal information.
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The amount and kind of actual court decisions, as well as those handled
by Datainspektionen, give an impression that the EU directive is actually
used and lived within the Swedish society.
Another success factor can be seen in the interaction of Datainspektionen
with the local data protection officers and companies. By providing sufficient
information and training courses, while at the same time also doing the au-
diting, they can ensure the right protection mentality within the companies.

Chapter 7
An IT guideline
In this chapter a guideline shall be given about how to handle IT operations
in accordance to data protection and other related laws as discussed before.
The discussion will be done with the focus on the before mentioned cat-
egories of data. The terms “business information” or similar expressions are
therefore always synonym to “personal related data that is used in a business
context”.
7.1 Scenario
The situation of a European company that has business operations in Austria
and Sweden will be investigated. Based on the requirements for those two
countries recommendations for a general Europe wide operation will be made.
The specific situation in each member state will not be looked at, but rather
a generic Europe orientated view will be made. This can then in a next step
be refined for the legal requirements in each European country.
Since the legal requirements are based on a certain idea of how information
should be managed, this guideline will start from the very basics of informa-
tion processing and then build up a structure that is suitable to comply with
EU regulations. While this kind of architecture might not be the only possi-
ble one, it has been chosen because it also resembles the current ideas in the
IT related sciences.
After the architecture has been defined, practical implementations are de-
scribed with examples and observations that are relevant to the topic of data
protection.
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7.2 Overview
As described in the chapters before, the data protection laws can only be
fulfilled if a business has an organized IT department. Otherwise it will be
impossible to control the usage of personal data, especially its spreading.
Further problems will arise when data inquiries need to be answered or cor-
rections need to be done, and it can not be made sure that all record copies
are found. Finally, without a well designed and managed IT environment it
will be impossible to secure the data storage against loss, or log access to it,
both of which are basic legal requirements.
Although this chapter will only have a look at the IT department, it must
not be forgotten that the IT and the back office of a company are tightly
bound together. When implementing an IT solution as described here, the
back office has therefore also to be kept in sync. Usually this is resolved by
having, at some point of the hierarchy, the same manager for both depart-
ments.
The core layers for an IT department, going from top to bottom, should
be
• classification of business data
– data not related to a person
– personal data
– sensitive data
• organizational responsibilities and authorizations
• IT applications and their security concept
• IT services
• physical setup
The reason for this structure is that a company works with data and informa-
tion in the first place, and the actual executing entities need to be designed
according to these needs, not the other way around. Or by using a principle
from classical architecture:
That form ever follows function. This is the law. [168]
Usually it holds true that the smaller the company is, the less organized will
this structure be, although very large organizations might also have problems
keeping the big picture in sync. Most of the time this stems from a lack of
understanding of the benefits, a common argument is that it will lead to
bureaucracy and hinders the growth of the business. While this is correct for
start-up companies at the very beginning, it has to be taken care of shortly
afterwards. Otherwise growth will become chaotic and the back office and IT
will spend most of their time on emergency actions instead of supporting the
business and optimizing the processes.
Therefore it is mandatory, even for the smallest business, to clearly define
the above mentioned areas and keep their IT and process design in shape.
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7.3 Systemic holistic view
Before looking at a department in specific, the general and abstract function-
ality should be investigated. A lot of information is available in the area of
management theory, which would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead
a short introduction and application of Cybernetics, as defined by Schoder-
bek et al. will be used as the general outline of what management and control
is.
7.3.1 Introduction
In their book “Management Systems” [167] Schoderbek et al. defined what
kind of systems exists and how their controls work.
7.3.1.1 First-order feedback systems (Automatic goal attainment)
tGOAL +
-
Feedback
Fig. 7.1 First-order feedback system
Here the output is used as part of the input, so that the system can reach in
the end the desired state. The classical example is a thermostat that changes
the temperature until the predefined level is reached.
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7.3.1.2 Second-order feedback systems (Automatic goal changer)
Detector
Eﬀector
Decision
Memory
search
=
recall
Memory
Fig. 7.2 Second-order feedback system
This system has a memory and can react based on past experiences. Expert
systems with learning abilities are an example.
7.3.1.3 Third-order feedback systems (Reflective goal changer)
Detector
Eﬀector
Decision Memory
Recall
Recombination
Fig. 7.3 Third-order feedback system (variant A)
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Detector
Eﬀector
Decision Memory
Recall
Recombination
Selection
Fig. 7.4 Third-order feedback system (variant B)
Such a system not only has a memory, but can also learn from past decisions
and evaluate future action paths to change its decision making process. It is
therefore able to reorganizes itself (variant A) or might even develop a kind
of consciousness (variant B).
7.3.2 Application in a business environment
Companies are usually considered to be a third-order feedback system, since
they are reorganized according to business needs in a permanently changing
economical environment.
Unfortunately this doesn’t hold true for SMBs in regard to IT security
or data protection. Since they often lack the required resources they behave
more like second- or even first-order systems, in that they only react after
security incidents or legal actions against them.
Even if they manage to control their internal IT security they might not
have sufficient “sensors” to detect outside changes in the data protection
requirements, such as new laws and their effects. Even worse, they might not
be aware of the layers described before (7.2) and therefore don’t even have a
control system at all for various types of data.
The solution for this is to clearly define business processes on a meta level
for all areas, especially IT, so that in fact a third-order feedback system can
be achieved:
• Who is responsible for the topic?
– Does the person have the necessary authority to change the current
behavior?
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• How can the current state be examined?
– Types of key data and how to collect them
– Are we effective?
• Which (internal and external) sensors can be utilized?
– Monitor the business environment
– Monitor the legal environment
– Monitor the social environment
• How will this knowledge be stored and accessed?
– Keeping it just in the heads of employees creates dependencies and is
risky
– Can we recover from losses or disasters?
• Recombine the knowledge and improve the situation
– Are the current processes effective?
– Evaluate the usefulness of the sensors
– Extrapolate the future environment and invent
7.3.3 Relevance
The first and foremost question for a SMB is of course how and why they
should finance (in terms of money and resources) such kind of management
and control, since it is perceived as not being relevant for economic survival.
By just looking at IT and data security we can see that the latter assump-
tion does not hold true anymore. The public becomes more and more aware
that we are living in an information society and that their data is as valuable
as any other of their physical property. This leads to a demand for more legal
protection, and especially enforcement of such. Furthermore the public starts
to punish corporate misconduct themselves by changing their economic be-
havior, such as buying from the competition. In the near future it will be
therefore mandatory for economic survival to comply with the expected data
protection level.
Such a level can only be achieved if a company has control over its pro-
cesses, in this case over their data handling and the lower layers that support
it, the IT department. As described before (7.3.2) this requires business pro-
cesses, and also meta processes which define a third-order feedback system.
Only such a system will be able to adopt in a timely manner to the ever
changing IT and legal environment, and also in an effective and efficient way.
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7.4.1 Definitions
A modern, state-of-the-art IT department is the result of a long evolution, in
fact such departments already existed before computers were invented. Their
duty was to store and manage the business data for the company, at first on
paper and starting with the first mainframes also in electronic form.
But the invention of computers allowed and required those back offices to
shift from data management to information processing, and this implicated
also a shift from passive storage actions to active process design. This shift
occurred alongside the DIKW hierarchy:
Data usually known as a collection of symbols, such as the alphabet or
numbers
Information on this level some kind of sense has been added, as the collection
of data describes something, for example “180cm”, “70%” or “25
years”
Knowledge this describes a deeper sense by utilizing predefined information,
like “Bob has a height of 180cm, is 25 years old and has an in-
come of 70% in relation to the national median”, this is also often
described as “how-to”
Wisdom is the ability to understand the structure behind knowledge and
therefore shape the existing knowledge as needed, this can be de-
scribed as “know-why”, for example “Bob only earns 70% because
in this society younger people are payed less than older ones”
This is a very basic definition of the DIKWmodel, a more detailed description
has been done by Ch. Zins [173].
While most people think of IT in a sense of data or information processor,
it is today in fact a knowledge manager and also a tool for wisdom man-
agement. On the lowest, technical level the IT department does indeed store
information, like emails or text documents. But since it provides also the
tools and resulting from this the processes for accessing this information,
it manages also the knowledge of the company. And resulting from this it is
also the interface and tool to apply wisdom, usually in the form of optimizing
processes or through data mining.
The term “information technology department” itself can be considered
outdated today, rather “knowledge -” or “process management department”
should be used.
In this thesis the term “DIKW” will be used to describe the above men-
tioned categories in general, and “pDIKW” if their content is related to a
person.
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7.4.1.1 Conflicts
A definition problem occurs now since the EU legislation always mentions
“data” and its protection, but according to the commonly accepted definition
above it should rather be “knowledge”. Any personal data consists not only of
information, such as “180cm” but is also related to a person, which connects
additional meaning to the information and it therefore becomes knowledge.
The legal term should for this reason rather have been “knowledge pro-
tection”, and also in in the Austrian case “information” instead of “indirect
personal related data”.
In the remaining part of the thesis the scientifically correct terms will be
applied, unless a specific law is quoted.
7.4.2 Organizational basics
The IT department itself is not a monolithic block, but rather consists of
further sub units. Depending on the size of the company are those units
not necessarily implemented as real, independent entities. In an SMB they
might even be done by one physical person, who furthermore might even be
a subcontractor.
The units can be vertically distinguished by their abstraction level accord-
ing to the DIKW model, and horizontal by the level of integration with other
parties. Each of those combinations is affected in a different way by personal
data and security related issues.
core back office end user external
knowledge flow
business processes
applications
authorization and authentification
operating system
hardware
Table 7.1 IT department units
core The IT environment itself, such as the LAN, servers and storage
media
back-office Infrastructure services for the company itself, such as HR and
accounting
end-user Internal business users, who utilize the two before mentioned ar-
eas to provide services to customers, such as sales, development
or customer services
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external Business partners, suppliers and customers, or in general parties
outside this legal entity
The top level here is the knowledge flow. It describes who will have access to
the business knowledge and in which way. This is the level at which any data
protection mechanism has to be implemented first. The design has then to
be made top-down, and each following level has to be designed to the needs
of the level above, including tools, software and hardware.
Each layer of this model needs to have security considered in its design, it
is not possible to add security afterwards or by using some kind of module.
Security is a process, not a product [166]
If the security of one layer breaks, then all layers on top of it are affected.
For example, if the authentification process in an application is broken, then
the access rights don’t work anymore because it will be possible to assume
another, higher privileged identity.
This approach is quite the opposite of how (small scale) IT systems are
usually planned: it starts with off-the-shelf hardware, adding the operating
system that comes pre-installed and then some commonly used business soft-
ware is added. Afterwards it is expected to put some business processes on
top of that and “security” is added. Obviously this can not work, as every
step taken from the bottom upwards limits the possibilities of the next level.
The top-down approach is of course easy to implement if no infrastructure
exists yet. Unfortunately in real life there is usually a grown infrastructure
that needs to be considered. SMBs do have an advantage here, as they are
able to migrate whole levels or systems at once because of the small size of
the IT infrastructure and flexibility of the IT department.
For larger corporations this causes a serious problem. Usually they try
to solve this by migrating their applications one by one into a new middle-
ware (such as SAP [165]) and then modify the top three layers in there. But
this basically locks them in with one vendor and therefore again removes
flexibility.
7.4.2.1 ITIL small scale implementation
As described before, it is mandatory to design the IT environment by splitting
it up into well defined areas. This idea is not new, and one of the most well
known methodologies is the Information Technology Infrastructure Library
or ITIL [161].
The full ITIL model is usually not suitable for a SMB, as it would imply
too much overhead. Therefore the ITIL small scale implementation [162] was
created, which better suits small IT teams.
The core idea of ITIL is to create IT services and provide a framework for
their design and operation. This enables a sound control of what is happening
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Fig. 7.5 The ITIL service lifecycle
in the IT environment and also enables the IT department to charge the
business according to their usage of specific resources. Furthermore it allows
monitoring and controlling of the IT services and therefore allows to exercise
control over the DIKW usage.
7.4.2.2 Recommended staffing
It can be assumed that a SMB only has limited resources to spend on the IT
department. Labor costs will therefore be, proportionally, a rather big part
of the while IT costs and therefore should be spent where the most benefit
can be gained.
As shown before, the way how and which data is handled has the most in-
fluence on the required infrastructure. The staffing question should therefore
be approached from a top down perspective, according to the table presented
before (7.1). The following numbers of dedicated IT personal are possible:
Zero In this case an external party has to provide the full service, which
also means that this party will have a considerable influence on
the business processes. Usually this situation should be avoided.
Half Here the IT person will also cover other business areas. A useful
combination can be made with managing the back office, since
those two areas interact often in regard to data handling and also
similar skills are needed for both. It should be avoided to combine
IT with business users, such as sales or marketing since this will
lead to conflicts of interest, and also the required skill set differs.
One If there is one person dedicated to IT tasks, then his skill set
should rather be with information, knowledge and business pro-
cesses than with technical details. As stated before, DIKW han-
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dling needs to be approached top down, and the technical imple-
mentation of the lower levels can easily be outsourced if there are
not enough resources internally.
Two+ As soon as there is a real IT department, consisting of two or
more people, more if not all vertical levels (7.1) can be covered
internally. Starting with two people the responsibilities should be
split up along those levels, into design and technical implemen-
tation, and then refined further when more manpower becomes
available.
Depending on the amount of human resources available, the top right part of
the table (7.1) should be the starting point, expanding to the left side, and
then covering more and more rows downwards as resources are added. This
allows the company to focus their in-house resources on those areas where
the most relevant DIKW occurs, and avoids dependencies on external parties
for business critical processes.
In case of Sweden should the company nominate a data protection officer
in any case, even if there is no dedicated IT person. The possibility to handle
the registration of applications and other tasks internally bears a very high
business value that should not be forfeit.
In general allows this approach to have at least one IT person in charge of
the pDIKW flow in and out of the company. This is an absolute requirement
to be able to have an overview about which pDIKW is processed and where
it is located. Which then is the basis to secure and backup the pDIKW or
respond to information requests.
7.4.2.3 Subcontractors and outsourcing
There are two ways of how to utilize external resources:
1. let an external party handle a whole service
2. use external manpower or resources to support an internal team
The first option is usually chosen because of cost reasons or because of lacking
know-how inside the IT department. Typically low-level services are affected
by this, such as hardware support or end user support regarding standard
software. No or very little training is required for the external party to be
able to work for the business and the external party can be exchanged rather
easily.
The second option is mostly used to help the internal team cope with
unusual workloads or one-time projects. The internal team can then focus
their effort onto tasks which require a sound understanding of the business
and use the external resources for otherwise minor tasks or such where only
little local know-how is required. But still this adds some new workload to
the internal team, as they now have to manage additional resources.
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Both possibilities are sometimes also done in a way that actually has a
negative effect on the business, when services are given to external parties
which require business know-how or affect a whole business process. In this
case the external party becomes part of the company, but as a black box
system. This introduces a source of problems into the business process which
can not easily be handled.
From a data protection viewpoint is the external party in both situations a
subcontractor. This means that whenever an external party is allowed access
to pDIKW, a data protection contract has to be signed. If they break the
law it will still be the outsourcing company that will be held responsible
[3, art. 17]. Although it has been shown that a court, especially in Austria,
usually states very low fines for such cases, the cost to the business will be
much higher. Customers might lose their trust in the company and business
partners might demand cost intensive improvements or audits. Therefore it
is important to include a contractual penalty appropriate to the potential
business impact, to encourage the external party to implement useful security
measures.
In Sweden the outsourcing company actually is required to monitor the
operations of the sub contractor [100, § 31], which is in general the approach
that should be taken in other countries as well [3, art .17 lit. 2]. As described
before, the interest has to be to prevent pDIKW issues and therefore busi-
nesses losses, and not only to be legally on the safe side.
If feasible, the external party should work with provided equipment in-
stead of their own, to mitigate at least on a technical level the risk of security
holes. This will also allow for easier monitoring of the data protection mea-
surements, as legally required.
7.4.3 Security basics
The DSG and PuL, as well as the EU regulations in general [3, art. 17 lit. 1],
require personal information to be protected
• against access by unauthorized parties
• against intended destruction
• against accidental destruction
and furthermore to log any
• access
• modification
• transfer
of it.
This can be achieved by providing the general security services of
• confidentiality
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• integrity
• availability
combined with user management for
• authentification
• authorization.
Since pDIKW is handled on all layers of the IT environment (7.1), it also has
to be protected on all of them.
While security on the lower layers is rather well understood and deployed
today, the top layer, which includes social interaction, is still a big security
risk. Malicious hackers, such as the infamous Kevin Mitnick, often gained
access to confidential information by convincing employees to ignore company
rules. Every employee should therefore on a regular basis be reminded of the
security policies, in accordance to the legal requirements such as the DSG
and PuL.
Both laws also require state of the art protection in relation to technical
possibilities . Here the field of research has to be closely monitored, since
measurements that were considered secure in the past could be broken at
any time, which would invalidate their usage. Examples are the now obso-
lete WEP encryption for wireless networks, or passwords and hashes with
less than 7 characters, which can be broken today in seconds through freely
available rainbow tables [164].
Again it is in the interest of the company to actually train their employees
and monitor their compliance, not only for legal reasons but to avoid business
losses.
7.4.4 Information and data security
7.4.4.1 Information as a value
First and foremost it needs to be understood that DIKW is a property with
value, similar to a physical object. In case of pDIKW the processor is not
even the sole owner of it, but rather a trustee, since the affected person itself
still holds rights to it and has several titles against the processor.
The processor therefore needs to define the value of the DIKW, based on
• the cost for replacement
• in case of loss, the risk for the person
• in case of loss, the penalty for himself
Based on this value, the required security measurements will have to be
planned.
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7.4.4.2 Information lifecycle
Like any common good has pDIKW a well defined lifecycle, it is created, used
and destroyed.
create
classify
USE
transfer
update
secure
destroy
Fig. 7.6 pDIKW lifecycle
Create The pDIKW is gathered from specific sources. This enables the
processor to ensure a certain quality, and also to answer the ques-
tion of origin if a person inquiries.
Classify Here the sensitivity of the pDIKW is specified. Based on it the
further handling will be determined. It is economically not feasible
to handle all pDIKW at the same level, but legally required for
some to be especially protected.
Use Based on the classification, only certain employees should have
access to the pDIKW (“need to know” principle). Furthermore
the law mandates that any usage has to be logged.
Transfer As soon as a subcontractor is used, a similar cycle has to be
defined within his organization. It is the responsibility of the pro-
cessor to monitor this.
Update It is mandated that any personal information has to be current,
depending on its usage.
Secure As described before can security measurements become obsolete
during the lifetime of the pDIKW. The legal requirements are
7.4 Internal IT 101
that security has to be provided according to current technical
possibilities, therefore a periodical evaluation is required.
Destruction When the underlying purpose of the pDIKW ceases to exist, it
needs to be destroyed. Failure to do so leads to unsecured and
outdated pDIKW, which has no business value but can lead to
liabilities.
Especially the last step, destruction, is usually an unaccustomed concept for
companies. Falling prices for storage media and advancing methods for data
mining give the impression that more pDIKW equals more value. It is often
forgotten that pDIKW needs to be secured and updated, which is a costly
process. Furthermore it can be argued what business relevance might be left
after several years.
7.4.5 Physical security
At the lowest level, the physical entities which hold pDIKW need to be se-
cured.
This starts with mandatory access controls to the rooms and buildings
where pDIKW is processed, which is even explicitly required by law. Common
mechanisms are a mandatory check-in at the reception and key cards or
similar controls for server rooms.
Any end users device need to have a log in system, so that any usage
can be attributed to a specific person [3, art. 17 lit. 1]. This includes not
only common PCs, but also laptops, smart phones or any other device that
provides access to pDIKW.
If there might be situations where pDIKW is stored or cached locally on
a device, then further protection is needed, or otherwise an unauthorized
person might gain access to it in case of loss, theft or reuse. Since the ac-
tual data medium, such as a hard disk, can more or less easily be retrieved
from a device, thereby bypassing any security mechanism that might exist in
software, the only way to accomplish protection is through full encryption of
the medium. Thus only the authorized user will be able to work with it. The
most common tool for PC platforms is the Open Source software TrueCrypt
[169], but there are also commercial solutions which can be integrated into
an enterprise wide authentification system.
7.4.5.1 Physical media lifecycle
Users often transfer pDIKW to other users by transport media, such as USB
sticks, therefore those have to be included in the protection concept.
Since such an extension results in the end in more costs, it first has to be
determined if such a transfer is necessary at all. End users often utilize such
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media because the existing system makes other ways of transfers unfeasible,
for example by providing bad usability, low speed or by not providing such
a service at all. The highest priority should therefore be given to solve the
issue already at this level. Another issue arises from the fact that by using
a transfer medium existing authorization and authentification systems are
usually circumvented, which might already be against the law [3, art. 17 lit.
1].
If a medium is required, then it needs to be at least encrypted. That
way a certain level of authorization can be implemented, and also protection
against theft (of the pDIKW) is given. In the case of USB sticks can this
be conveniently realized by distributing them centrally and pre-installing
encryption software on them.
When unencrypted media are used more precaution needs to be taken.
Every medium should be identifiable, such as by a printed serial number.
Possession of it should be registered and confined to secured areas. The latter
can be realized through RFID tags which set off an alarm when a certain area
is left.
During their lifetime media need to be tested for integrity. Items like CDs
or DVDs deteriorate over time, and after a while the legal requirement of
protection against accidental loss [3, art. 17 lit. 1] is not fulfilled anymore.
Such media should therefore also not be used as the only occurrence of certain
pDIKW sets.
When the medium or the pDIKW on it reaches its end of life, the medium
needs to be securely overwritten or destroyed, depending on the storage tech-
nology. While it has been shown for hard disks [171] that common “secure
deletion” programs, such as DBAN [154], really do remove any data beyond
recoverability, the same might not hold true for other technologies. In such
a case the medium has to be physically destroyed. Examples are USB sticks,
backup tapes, CDs, DVDs or Flash memory cards.
It should not be forgotten that log files often contain pDIKW as well, and
therefore their physical medium has to be treated in the same way.
7.4.6 Design of applications and services
Modern application or services are usually designed in multiple layers, such
as the user interface, the business logic and the database access. The issue
of pDIKW has to included from the beginning in this design, or otherwise
personal and non-personal DIKW might be mixed together unnecessarily.
This would extend the area which needs special protection and thereby inflicts
avoidable costs.
Again a top down approach should be taken. The combination of personal
and non-personal DIKW should happen as late as possible, which allows to
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have two distinguished technical areas. This separation should then continue
down to the lowest technical layers. Examples could be
• separate file servers for pDIKW and marketing material
• separate databases and servers for the inventory and sales system
• specific printers and printer queues on different servers for marketing ma-
terial and customer communication
• different websites and infrastructure for providing technical information
and the online web shop
Apart from technical diagrams about the infrastructure, the IT documen-
tation also has to include a flow diagram for pDIKW. Only that way can
systems with special protection needs be identified and their access logged in
an appropriate way.
If such a separation is not possible because the IT infrastructure is so
small, then the whole environment must be secured adequately to the the
most sensitive pDIKW found on it. Up to a certain size this will actually be
economically more feasible than managing the pDIKW flow at all.
7.4.6.1 Backup and storage
To protect against accidental loss, one part of the IT requirements is to
have backups of all DIKW. Usually an economic decision about the need
for backups is made based on the costs to recreate the lost DIKW. This is
not valid in case of personal related DIKW, since the law requires to protect
against accidental or deliberate loss in any case [3, art. 17 lit. 1]. Backups are
therefore mandatory.
The “need to know” principle can be applied here in the way that the person
who is handling the backup should not have access to the actual pDIKW on
it. Thus the requirement for any further protection measurements can be
avoided. This can be done by creating the backup set inside the system and
then only writing out an encrypted block to the backup medium.
An example would be a database backup script which exports the daily
changes, encrypts them and then writes this record to a tape drive. That way
the handling of the tapes could be done by regular staff, such as a secretary
in a remote branch, without coming in conflict with data protection laws. It
also mitigates risks in case of theft of the medium.
7.4.6.2 Using external services
Nearly no company works independently nowadays, the usage of third parties
for specialized services is rather common. Usually the processor is aware that
he is giving pDIKW to another party and therefore has to apply the legal
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requirements, such as in the case of using a credit score provider. In other
cases this might not be so obvious, for example:
• Hiring a specialist as a subcontractor, instead of as an employee, to work
on specific pDIKW set
• Using a web statistics provider, such as Google Analytics [158], who eval-
uates the customers IP addresses and their behavior on the web page
• Using a CRM system that is hosted by a third party for managing and
sending marketing emails
• Using HTML code in emails to track their reading through a third party
service provider
In all of those cases pDIKW is processed by a third party, which requires a
service contract, monitoring by the processor and so forth [3, art. 17].
It has therefore to be considered during the design phase of an application,
what parts are economically and legally feasible to be outsourced, and which
are too risky from a security and liability perspective.
7.4.7 User and identity management
One central legal requirement is authentification, authorization and logging
[3, art. 17 lit. 1]. Only those users who have been instructed to work on specific
pDIKW should have access to it, and any usage has to be logged. This covers
not only the actual applications, but also access to files or physical access -
in the end all layers of the IT infrastructure (7.1) need to be covered.
Most operating systems already provide tools to monitor file access, but
not all off the shelf applications do so, which means that they can not be
used for pDIKW.
A user identity also has a lifecycle, similar to the DIKW one, with the
additional effect that this becomes pDIKW itself, since it is related to a
person (the user). This recursion has to be taken into consideration when
designing the IT environment. As soon as biometric DIKW is involved it
even becomes sensitive data in the terms of the law [3, art. 8 lit. 1].
Also the requirement of non-excessive data usage needs to be observed [3,
art. 6c]. It depends on the sensitivity of the pDIKW which kind of identifica-
tion properties can be used, such as name, photograph, fingerprints or other
biometric systems.
7.4.7.1 HR interface
The first and last step within the lifecycle of an user identity will be done
through the human resources department.
When a new employee joins the company the following steps are required:
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• general information about the data protection laws, especially his obliga-
tion to secrecy even after the end of his employment
• instructions about the approved usage of the IT and back office environ-
ment
• instructions about pDIKW usage [3, art. 16]
• optional in Sweden: information about the “personuppgiftsombud” and his
role
• optional in Austria: information about existing “Betriebsvereinbarungen”
with the workers’ council
This information should be handed out in written and confirmed through his
signature.
Although there are no explicit legal requirements given when an employee
leaves the company, the following steps should be taken:
• signed confirmation that he does not hold any company devices or media
anymore
• signed confirmation that he did not leave any of his private DIKW on
company devices or media
• suspension of all his software accounts and access tokens
For technical reasons it is often not possible to simply delete user accounts,
since this might interfere with the integrity of log files or other databases.
Instead the account should be disabled, or if not possible, protected with a
maximum length random password.
The HR department will most definitely be handling sensitive data in
terms of the law, since they need to process medical information, such as
the duration and reason for a sick leave, or results from job assessments.
For this reason, and also because of the general higher sensitivity of their
pDIKW, should their IT infrastructure be separated from other departments.
Otherwise they might contaminate, in a legal sense, for example a regular file
server, and then the whole server would have to be protected on this high
level.
7.4.8 Monitoring and surveillance
All affected employees or third parties have to be made aware of the moni-
toring. In case of cameras it needs to be done through signs, and in case of
software it should be included in the signed working contract. Furthermore
should this information readily be available to all employees.
There are four general situations where monitoring of employees or other
parties can occur. In all of those cases has this to be considered processing
of pDIKW which leads to legal requirements.
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7.4.8.1 Required by the law, such as logging usage of pDIKW
This has to be included into the application design as described before, but
also mechanisms of the operating system might be needed if the pDIKW is
accessed on a plain file level. While common text files, such as a letter, are
unstructured data, the same can not be assumed for a spread sheet. According
to the law [3, art. 2 lit. c], if it can be accessed by multiple criteria then it is
considered a data application. This holds true for any list in a spreadsheet,
since it can easily be sorted or searched by each column. It might therefore
require a registration, but definitely needs to be monitored for any access.
7.4.8.2 Desired by the company to protect their property
The usual approach is to use video cameras, which requires the consent of
the employees. As discussed before, the legal requirements are rather easy
to handle in Sweden. Austria further distinguishes among technical details,
which is why there an old fashioned analog surveillance system with limited
recording should be preferred.
7.4.8.3 For technical reasons to manage utilization and provide
technical protection
Often the IT operators log a lot of application or access data, because it
is easy to enable and a common setup. Unfortunately this includes usually
pDIKW and they might not be aware of the legal consequences. Examples
would be the logging of access to filtered websites, login and logout times or
email server logs.
It should be analyzed which logs really bring a tangible benefit at all, and
where also the identification of the user is required. If there is no justified
cause, then pDIKW can not be processed. Especially for utilization statistics
can it be sufficient to rather log anonymized data.
Replacing the actual identifier, for example an IP address, with a hash
value is only possible for external cases. In internal cases it can be argued
that, for example by hashing all internal IP addresses, the original identifier
can always be looked up again.
7.4.8.4 Digital forensics
If there is evidence that a criminal act has been committed by using a com-
puter on similar device, then it needs to be secured and investigated for
further legal actions. Although this most probably will include pDIKW, such
usage is covered by the exception for criminal proceedings [3, art. 13 lit. 1].
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But since usually an external specialist will commit this analysis, a contract
has to be made with him and all other legal requirements for subcontractors
need be observed since the exception only applies to the processor himself.
7.5 Business to customer
7.5.1 Homepage
There should be a separation between the rather static informational home-
page and dynamic content such as web shops and forums. Both parts have
different security requirements and also a different userbase that may want
to make changes. At least a different subdomain should be used, such as
“webshop.company.com”, and if possible it should be placed on a different
server.
The static page can be outsourced to a hosting provider, since it will not
contain pDIKW, also it will receive the most traffic which would otherwise
add costs to the local Internet bandwidth requirements.
The dynamic content on the other hand will only be visited by customers
who consider to buy goods or want to participate in discussions, and there-
fore needs to be integrated with internal IT systems. This leads to higher
security requirements which can be best fulfilled if everything is within one
system and location. If this can not be done, then the provider hosting the
dynamic content is considered a subcontractor and the processor has super-
vising obligations.
Both sites need to be secured through the HTTPS protocol, the web shop
for apparent security reasons. But even the static page may be altered during
transfer by some providers who experiment with adding advertisements to
HTML code they transfer [163]. Since this is not apparent for the customer,
he will accredit the whole content to the company which then could lead to
legal consequences.
To further secure the static site, a content management system (CMS)
can be used internally to build the site, but then will be exported as plain
HTML code. That way no dynamic functionality, which is prone to attacks, is
exposed to the Internet. This externally visible content can also be regularly
compared to the internal version by a monitoring script to detect successful
hacks (“defacement”) in a timely manner.
External graphics, such as advertisements or product pictures from a sup-
plier, should never be included indirectly (embedded), since they might be
exchanged with malicious content at the third party’s site. They would also
allow the external party to monitor which clients are accessing the site, which
is a leak of pDIKW and can be hold against the company. Instead a local
108 7 An IT guideline
copy needs to be used, which can also be converted to another image format
to render malicious data streams ineffective.
When using external services on purpose it has to be investigated if
pDIKW will be involved. In such a case the external party is a subcontractor
and all legal obligations apply [3, art. 17 lit. 2]. This is often overlooked when
using services such as Google Analytics [158] or other tracking services. They
utilize the customer’s IP and other pDIKW, and are often even located out-
side the EU, which constitutes therefore a transfer to a third country. This
might even already be the case when pictures or other data are embedded
from a third party.
7.5.1.1 Static content
If internal information about the company should be published, then the
consent of the employees is needed when publishing information about them.
Common examples are pictures of employees or of company meetings. While
the publishing of contact information, such as name, phone number and posi-
tion is allowed, further information might be problematic. Especially medical
information (“is currently sick”) has to be avoided at all [3, art. 8 lit. 1]. The
work contract with each employee should clearly state what pDIKW about
them will be made publicly available.
An imprint needs to be available, in Sweden easily accessible and in Austria
further more accessible from every page.
7.5.1.2 Dynamic content
A lot of current CMS or web shop products have severe security issues, such
as being prone to SQL injection. Since the law requires up to date protection
measurements, those systems need to be monitored and updated as soon as
a patch is available. This might be more easy for a dedicated provider, who
serves a multitude of customers, than for a small company, which has to be
taken into account when deciding about local or remote hosting.
There is no obligation for the processor to monitor user content proactively,
but he needs to act as soon as he becomes aware of unlawful content [8, § 14].
While this does not result in a requirement for 24x7 monitoring, for a regular
business, it still can be a problem if the responsible IT person is on vacation
or otherwise unavailable. If a SMB wants to accept user content then they
need therefore to provide the necessary human resources.
In case of Sweden it should be checked if an “utgivningsbevis” can be
applied for, as this would add further protection.
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7.5.1.3 Web shop
In addition to the consideration for dynamic content the requirements for
electronic commerce need to be observed, such as the extended imprint in
Austria.
When receiving customer orders through the web shop, no automatic order
confirmation should be generated through it. Since the web shop might have
a security weakness, a fraudulent order may be generated which would be
hard to legally challenge if it was already confirmed through the site. Instead
each order needs to be approved by an employee.
Also the order process has to be separated from the technical communi-
cation. The fact that an email was received or confirmed by an email server
does not constitute the acceptance of an order. Such events need to be stated
explicitly.
7.5.2 Marketing
7.5.2.1 Data collection
For private customers the usage of their pDIKW is always an opt-in situation,
therefore when using it for marketing it can only come from three sources:
• Existing pDIKW about current customers; this can only be used for ad-
vertising in the same business area where his pDIKW originated from
• Gathering new pDIKW from customers; in this case they have to agree to
the usage
• Buying pDIKW from commercial database providers; here the provider or
seller has to prove that the people in their database have agreed to the
usage
If the company collects the data themselves, then apart from informing the
customers about it, they should also explain where the value for the customer
is in it. Otherwise the collected data will be incomplete or wrong. Especially
in situations where a company tries to force customers to divulge pDIKW
because they otherwise won’t have access to information, such as software
updates, the customer will often simply provide false data which is then of
no use to the company but still inflicts costs for protection.
7.5.2.2 Advertising
Any form of personalized advertising needs to provide an opt-out mechanism,
such as a HTTP link in an email. This has to remove the customer perma-
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nently from further campaigns; sending a reminder for example one month
later to ask if he was sure or wants to join again is not valid.
As with web sites, when using third parties for advertising they have to
be considered subcontractors with all legal consequences [3, art. 17 lit. 2].
It should therefore be avoided to use common Internet messaging or CRM
services, which may be hosted outside the EU, for personalized campaigns.
Apart from this issue will the advertisement often be filtered by the customer
since it originates from well known “spam” sources.
7.5.2.3 Social media accounts
With the advent of “Web 2.0” services more and more companies try to com-
municate with their customers through sites such as Xing [172] or Facebook
[157].
This is a gray legal area without any court decisions yet. It can be argued
that the customer publishes his pDIKW by his own free will and then informs
the company about the location. In this case the pDIKW won’t be protected.
Another argumentation would be that the company uses the web service as
a subcontractor to enable people to share their pDIKW with them, in which
case the data protection laws fully apply [3, art. 17 lit. 2]. As a general rule,
when contact information is managed through such a service, then it has to
be made sure that the customer contacts the company first as this can be
considered an opt-in act.
A second problem area is that of account ownership. It needs to be clearly
stated internally that only company-provided service accounts may be used
to conduct business. The IT department needs to provide a mechanism so
that the company can always reclaim ownership of the account in case an
employee changes the password or otherwise tries to make it unavailable to
the company. A similar problem exists if an employee uses his own private
account for business purposes, for example when a sales person manages his
customer contacts that way. Apart from the legal issues with pDIKW in that
case, the business information is lost when this employee leaves the company.
No law case has so far been done in Austria or Sweden to investigate this
area.
7.5.3 Job applications
In case of a SMB should job applications only be handled through email or
paper. Building an applicant database, such as often seen in large corpora-
tions, has very limited value for a SMB but instead leads to higher security
requirements and therefore higher costs.
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Since pDIKW may only be processed for a specific purpose and the time
needed [3, art. 6 lit. 1], the HR department needs to collect those emails in a
separate mail folder, which allows for easy destruction once the new employee
has been determined. If there are paper printouts or letters then they need
to be handled in the same way.
If the applicant sent code examples or other copyright protected material
then it has to be made sure that all copies are destroyed afterwards. Otherwise
he might claim later on that the company used his ideas for their own purpose
which could lead to intellectual property liabilities.
7.6 Business to business
The same tools as in the B2C case can also be used for B2B, but usually
there is an opportunity for further automated integration. In the case of a
SMB however it has to be evaluated if the long term cost reductions and
efficiency gains justify the high entrance costs into this technology. Systems
of automated order processing and contract signing through certificates need
up front investments into hardware and knowledge, which means costly man
power. It can be argued that the smaller the company, the less economically
feasible will such a solution be. With the same reasoning the situation at the
other company needs to be considered. The technology can not be utilized if
the partner is not at the same technical level, or can not provide sufficient
IT security.
In general the same protection requirements as in the B2C area are given,
with the exception that Austria gives pDIKW about companies the same level
of protection as that of private persons, while Sweden differs between those.
In practice this does not make such a big difference, since often information
about contact persons at the partner company will be handled, which then
constitutes pDIKW even in Sweden. Therefore should no further distinction
be made in practice between B2C and B2B pDIKW when designing the
security requirements.
7.6.1 Unstructured data handling
At very small companies no real business database might exist, instead most
of the work is done manually and even accounting is handled by an external
specialist. But there are still common situations where the full data protection
laws apply:
• Although the work is done on paper or text documents, which can be con-
sidered unstructured collections, contact listings are often handled through
spreadsheets or address lists in the email client. Both of those are struc-
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tured databases, as described before, and are therefore considered data
applications.
• If the tax consultant compiles a list of the companies business partners to
simplify his work, then he is also utilizing a data application. In this case
he is doing it by instructions of the company, or it may be argued that
he does it illegally if he has not been instructed so. In the first case the
company is still in the role of a processor who utilizes a subcontractor,
and therefore is fully responsible for the protection of the DIKW [3, art.
17 lit. 2].
7.6.2 Signatures
If electronic transactions will be done between two parties, then they need to
be signed by electronic signatures to provide the necessary protection. The
legal basis for this has been done through an EU directive [7] which has been
adopted into national law, but according to an EU survey [155] the resulting
implementations differ across the EU. In regard to Austria and Sweden the
study highlights the following points:
• Although there are no legal obstacles to use certificates between the two
countries, interoperability issues and regulations have led to isolated “is-
land” solutions where cross border applications are rather difficult.
• It is rather difficult and expensive for the providers of the necessary hard-
ware to get it certified. Only in Austria are more than two devices available.
It can be said that it is in general more easy to utilize signatures within a
country than across borders. Still Austria is in general below the EU average
when it comes to B2B usage and even Sweden has room for improvement
[156].
As a side note, even if two business partners do not want or can not use
(qualified) certificates based on the EU directive, they still can use other or
self signed certificates combined with a frame contract. But this will not be
covered by the local signature legislation since it is just a regular business
agreement.
There are differences in which cases a signature can be applied. In Austria
it is considered equal to a handwritten signature, while it is in Sweden rather
another method of signing that needs to be agreed on or have a legal base. It
is therefore necessary in Sweden to include an agreement into the terms and
conditions or a frame contract.
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7.6.2.1 Signature lifecycle
First, as discussed before, it needs to be evaluated if the costs for handling
the signature are worth the benefit.
Technical and organizational procedures need to be in place in case the
signature is lost or stolen. A backup of it will need additional protection, such
as encryption, to avoid misuse or duplication of the backup version. If the
certificate is attributed to a person, it even becomes pDIKW and therefore
requires further protection.
Apart from becoming unavailable, the signature will also have to be up-
dated or replaced after it becomes invalid. This can happen because its va-
lidity expires or when technical progress makes the cryptographic algorithms
in use obsolete. Processes are required to make sure that already signed data
can still be used, or re-signed with the new one.
Also the access to the signature needs to be managed. Austria only allows
certificates for physical persons, therefore every affected employee will require
his own one. While Sweden also allows a certificate for a company, it should
internally be further protected again by individual certificates who then allow
access to the company certificate.
7.6.2.2 Invoices
A common use of signatures will be for electronic invoices. Current law re-
quires qualified signatures for this, but as mentioned before a new EU direc-
tive [27] amends this.
SMBs should therefore wait until this amendment is implemented into
national law, and then agree with their business partners upon a simplified
version of security, such as self signed certificates that are only used between
those two parties, or encrypted PDFs together with a weekly summary as a
protective measurement.
7.6.3 Automated transactions
By utilizing digital signatures business partners can implement automated
transactions in a legally sound way. Examples can be automated orders, origi-
nating from project data out of the ERP systems or executed by falling below
a certain inventory stock.
It has to be taken care that such actions do not affect physical persons,
since otherwise the legislation about automated individual decisions [3, art.
15] will be applicable.
Otherwise no explicit legal requirements are given, but common IT and
process security measurements should be employed:
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• Using an encrypted VPN communication tunnel
• Doing sanity checks on outgoing and incoming transactions and rejecting
suspicious ones - this needs to be covered by the frame contract
• Exchanging summary information on a regular base, which is then checked
by a human
7.7 Conclusion and recommendations
A company that aims to follow the EU regulations in regard to data protec-
tion can orientate itself by the examples of Austria and Sweden.
7.7.1 Technical and organizational
The primary task is to create an IT environment that is actually able to
follow and focus on the flow of DIKW. While this is not only an advantage
for handling the legal issues, it also aids the company in defining the best
business processes for its value chain.
Based on this the actual architecture and design of the IT should be done.
This allows then for an easier identification of pDIKW, and the application
of the legal requirements for it.
A European company needs therefore to understand that it handles virtual
goods (pDIKW) in the first place, and then, as a result of this, physical goods.
While the current IT education aims to support such an environment,
the awareness in other business areas will be insufficient. The more difficult
task for a company will be to train its non-IT staff to handle pDIKW with
the proper care. The idea that pDIKW is a valuable good that needs to be
protected and processed according to set rules is unfortunately not part of
the common educational system.
7.7.2 Legal
Although Austria and Sweden are similar, they differ in their implementation
of the EU legislation. The same can be expected from the other member
states, which therefore requires a company to research all individual details.
But by comparing the EU legislation with the examples in Austria in
Sweden it can be shown that the deviations are not too severe. Generally the
business philosophy should include these points:
• Inform the client when pDIKW is collected and for what reason
• Secure and monitor access to the pDIKW
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– Ensure the same during outsourcing
– Restrictions exist for business partners outside the EU
• No hidden surveillance or log evaluation
• Be identifiable to all customers
• Use qualified signatures for electronic commerce
The area of electronic DIKW processing is rather new, from a legal perspec-
tive. The laws and regulations are therefore still in motion, and the situation
changes every year, as for example with the electronic invoices [27, art. 233].
It is therefore mandatory for a company to monitor the legislation process
on the EU and national level, and also observe local court decisions in their
countries of operation.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 General
Apart from the geographic size, Austria and Sweden seem to be similar coun-
tries. Both have about the same population, similar population distribution
over some major cities and otherwise rural land, and also a comparable po-
litical history. Even their economic history during the last 50 years has simi-
larities, growing from a rather agricultural society into a modern one with a
mixture of industry, service and information areas.
But when looking at the society, and the expectations that the citizens
have about their government, significant differences can be observed. Those
led in the end to different practical realities in how data protection is handled
in those two countries.
If a company plans to conduct business in Austria and Sweden, then the
legal requirements in regard to data protection will be not too different.
Although Sweden offers some advantages through an internal data protection
officer, the basic requirements about how personal data has to be handled are
similar. Austria tries to simplify some issues by allowing the local workers’
council to make agreements instead of their members, but this catches only
the data handling between the employer and the employees.
Also the obligations for providing services over the Internet are compara-
ble, only the handling of video surveillance differs noticeable.
The actual differences arise from how the company will be treated by the
public and by their business partners. The fact that here is little pressure
from the government in Austria and the rather bureaucratic handling of the
registration has led to a climate in which the protection of personal data does
not have a very high priority, unless it can lead to direct business losses. In
Sweden, on the other hand, the public demands protection by their govern-
ment, and is also very sensible to breaches by a company. Trust is in general
highly valued. This has led to a climate where companies see data protection
as a real business value.
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It can therefore be concluded that a company needs to implement similar
technical solutions in both countries, but different business processes have to
be employed. While the reaction in Austria has to focus on the legal aspects,
in Sweden the potential loss of trust has to be mitigated.
8.2 Limitations
This thesis focused on the issues of protecting personal data and conduct-
ing business on the Internet. While those areas have been covered in detail,
adjacent legal topics have only been given an introduction. Issues such as
copyright, contract law or liabilities can be named as examples. Such topics
also need to be taken into consideration, but since there is sufficient existing
literature available they have been left out here.
Furthermore the provided cheat sheets give an overview and guideline to
an interested IT person. But without further education in data protection and
practical work with actual issues they will not be sufficient to fully implement
a legally watertight data processing environment.
Also the history of how the government is build up and acts in both coun-
tries, as well as the political background about how the current legislation
came into existence is left out, since this is mostly of historical or sociological
interest.
Chapter 9
Appendix
9.1 Cheat sheet Austria
9.1.1 Validity of data collection, processing and
transmission
9.1.1.1 Prerequisites [31, § 6]
• For a specific purpose, and
• only in the necessary amount, and
• only for the necessary time
9.1.1.2 Register requirements [31, §§ 16-19]
• None, if
– only public available data, or
– only indirect personal related data, or
– covered by a template application
• May only start after a positive approval by the DSK, if
– sensitive data, or
– information about criminal convictions or similar, or
– information about credit ratings, or
– part of an interconnected information processing system
• May start together with the application in any other case
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9.1.1.3 Processing
• Of personal data[31, §§ 7-8]
– legally published information, or
– consent of the person, or
– to fulfill a contract between the controller and the person
• Of sensitive data [31, §§ 7, 9]
– published by the person beforehand, or
– in form of indirect personal related data, or
– consent of the person, or
– required to fulfill legal obligations as an employer, or
– for medical usage if handled by medical personal who are bound by
their duty to observe secrecy
9.1.1.4 Cede (“überlassen”) [31, §§ 10-11]
• Definition
– using a third party for processing the data, and
– the controller stays responsible for any misuse
• Obligations of the controller
– contract with the third party to ensure that they comply with the DSG,
and
– monitor the fulfillment of this contract, and
– have a written documentation about the obligations described below
• Obligations of the third party
– use the data exclusively for the purpose given by the controller, and
– only use personal that is legally bound to observe the data secrecy, and
– only use other subcontractors if approved by the controller, and
– has to destroy the data after the contract ends
9.1.1.5 Transfer (“übermitteln”)
• Definition
– Providing the data to a third party for their own purpose, or using the
data internally for another than the stated purpose.
• Requirements
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– The same rules as for processing (9.1.1.3) apply.
9.1.1.6 Cede or transfer to another country [31, §§ 12-13]
• The requirements for cede or transfer as stated above need to be fulfilled
in any case.
• No DSK approval is required for
– European Economic Area, or
– countries with equivalent protection (5.2.8), or
– data that is publicly available in Austria, or
– data that is only indirect personal related for the recipient, or
– transfers with the consent of the person, or
– to fulfill a contract between the controller and the person, or
– data from an application that did not require a DVR registration
• DSK approval is required beforehand
– in any other case
9.1.2 Data protection requirements for processors
• Protection against loss and accidental or illegal destruction of data
• Protection against access by third parties
• Clear orders to employees about what they may or may not do with the
data, and provide them with permanent access to those orders
• Educate the employees about their duties according to the DSG [31, § 15]
• Control physical access
• Control logical access to programs and data
• Log any access to the data
• Document the measurements that are taken to fulfill the above
• Any documentation has to be kept for three years
9.1.3 Imprint
Required on any web page and other business communication, such as emails:
• Company name
• Company register number and responsible court
• Geographic address
• Legal form
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This can be simplified by providing a link to the corresponding “Firmen A-Z”
WKO page [88].
9.1.3.1 Order forms
In addition to the above stated, web order forms also need to provide
• a copy of the terms and conditions that can be downloaded
9.1.4 Shortcuts
9.1.4.1 Relevant organizations
• DSK: http://www.dsk.gv.at
• DSR: http://www.datenschutzrat.gv.at
• Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: http://firmen.wko.at
• RTR: http://www.rtr.at
• ARGE Daten: http://www.argedaten.at
• RIS: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at
9.1.4.2 Documents
• Registering a data application:
http://www.dsk.gv.at/site/6296/default.aspx
• Template contracts according to the DSG:
http://www.dsk.gv.at/site/6208/default.aspx
• Various templates by ARGE Daten:
http://www2.argedaten.at/php/cms_monitor.php?q=MUSTERBRIEFE
9.2 Cheat sheet Sweden
9.2.1 Validity of data collection, processing and
transmission
If the application is covered by the TF [93], such as through an “utgivnings-
bevis”, then no further rule needs to be applied [100, § 7].
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9.2.1.1 Prerequisites [100, § 9]
• For a specific purpose, and
• only in the necessary amount, and
• only for the necessary time
9.2.1.2 Register requirements
• None, if
– a data protection officer exists [100, § 37], in which case he has to keep
a register
• May only start after a positive approval by Datainspektionen, if
– there is no data protection officer, or
– genetic information is processed
9.2.1.3 Processing
• Of personal data [100, § 10]
– consent of the person, or
– to fulfill a contract between the controller and the person
Data may not be used for direct marketing if the person requests so.
• Of sensitive data [100, §§ 13-19]
– published by the person beforehand, or
– consent of the person, or
– required to fulfill legal obligations as an employer, or
– for medical usage if handled by medical personal who are bound by
their duty to observe secrecy
• Of the Swedish personal number (“personnummer”) [100, § 22]
– consent of the person, based on a really free choice, or
– reliable identification is required
9.2.1.4 Subcontractor (“personuppgiftsbiträde”) [100, §§ 30-31]
• Definition
– A subcontractor is a third party that processes data on behalf of the
controller.
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• Obligations of the controller
– Contract with the subcontractor which allows him only to use the data
according to instructions, and requires him to protect the data according
to [100, § 31]
– Investigate beforehand if the the subcontractor is able to fulfill this
obligation, and afterwards control that the protection is in place and
used
• Obligations of the subcontractor
– Use the data exclusively for the purpose given by the controller
9.2.1.5 Transfer
• Definition
– Providing the data to a third party for their own purpose, or using the
data internally for another than the stated purpose.
• Requirements
– The same rules as for processing (9.2.1.3) apply.
9.2.1.6 Cede or transfer to another country
The EU and European Economic Area is not considered a third country.
Otherwise the transmission is allowed in case of
• countries with equivalent protection, as listed in 5.2.8, or
• consent of the person, or
• to fulfill a contract between the controller and the person
9.2.2 Data protection requirements for processors [100,
§ 31]
• Provide adequate organizational and technical protection of the data, de-
pending on the sensitivity of it
9.2.3 Imprint [105, § 8]
• Name
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• Address
• Email address
And, if applicable
• Organizational number
• Tax number
• Regulatory agency
9.2.3.1 Order forms
In addition to the above stated, web order forms also need to provide [105, §
13]
• A copy of the terms and conditions that can be downloaded
9.2.4 Shortcuts
9.2.4.1 Relevant organizations
• Datainspektionen: http://www.datainspektionen.se
• Konsumentverket: http://www.konsumentverket.se
• RTVV: http://www.rtvv.se
• Supreme Court: http://www.hogstadomstolen.se
9.2.4.2 Documents
• Registering a data application or data protection officer:
http://www.datainspektionen.se/ladda-ner-och-bestall/informationsmaterial/blanketter/
• Utgivningsbevis:
http://www.rtvv.se/se/Internet/utgivningsbevis/
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Chapter 11
Abstract (English)
The European Union strives to unify the legal situation in regard to data
processing in Europe. This is done through directives, which then have to
be implemented into national law. As a result of this process the local legal
situation varies among the member states. This introduces additional hurdles
for small to medium sized companies who operate across borders, apart from
their already existing struggles to comply with their local legal requirements.
This thesis describes for Austria and Sweden the legal regulations that
apply to a company handling information. Special emphasis has been given
to practical examples and court decisions to point out the legal pitfalls in
processing information by electronic means. The analysis focuses on process-
ing business information between two entities as well as using information
technology for internal purposes.
After introducing the legal situation, the second part of the work describes
how a company can approach the issue at hand. By using a theoretical model
the possible information flows and connections are shown and how they are
affected by the legal requirements. Practical solutions are then provided and
the differences in their implementation in Austria and Sweden are pointed
out.
The thesis concludes with a high level comparison of the situation in the
two countries, and general advice about which data protection philosophy a
company should chose for each of them.
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Chapter 12
Abstract (German)
Die Europäische Union strebt danach die rechtliche Situation für elektronis-
che Datenverarbeitung in Europa zu vereinheitlichen. Dies geschieht durch
Direktiven welche dann in nationalen Gesetzen implementiert werden müssen.
Als ein Effekt dieses Prozesses variiert die lokale rechtliche Situation in
den Mitgliedsstaaten. Dadurch entstehen zusätzliche rechtliche Hindernisse
für Klein- und Mittelbetriebe welche über Landesgrenzen hinweg operieren,
zusätzlich zu deren bereits bestehenden Anstrengungen die lokalen Vorgaben
zu befolgen.
Diese Arbeit beschreibt für Unternehmen in Österreich und Schweden
die rechtlichen Vorschriften hinsichlich Informationsverarbeitung. Besonderes
Augenmerk wurde auf praktische Beispiele und Gerichtsurteile gelegt, um
die rechtlichen Fallstricke im Rahmen der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung
aufzuzeigen. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf die Verarbeitung von Geschäftsin-
formationen zwischen zwei Parteien sowie die Verwendung von Information-
stechnologie für interne Zwecke.
Nach der Darlegung der rechtlichen Situation beschreibt der zweite Teil
der Arbeit wie ein Unternehmen an diese Probleme herangehen kann. Mittels
eines theoretischen Modells werden die Informationsflüsse und Verbindungen
aufgezeigt, und wie sie durch die rechtlichen Anforderungen betroffen sind.
Praktische Lösungen werden dargelegt und deren Unterschiede in der Imple-
mentierung in Österreich und Schweden hervorgehoben.
Die Arbeit schliesst mit einem generellen Vergleich der Situation in beiden
Ländern, und Hinweisen darüber welche Datenschutz-Philosophie ein Un-
ternehmen jeweils wählen sollte.
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